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LEAD ARTICLES

Preventing

Partnership
Outs

Freeze-

by Franklin A. Gevurtz*

l.

INTRODUCTION

Considerable literature explores appropriate legal responses to freezeouts in both public and closely held corporations .1 Writers, however, have
paid relatively little attention to the same phenomenon in partnerships. 2
The reason for this inattention is not entirely clear. Perhaps writers have
viewed partnerships as an unimportant business entity. This view has always been questionable,3 and now is entirely untenable in light of recent
* Professo r of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento , California. U .C.L.A. (B.S., 1974); University of Ca lifornia , Berkeley (J.D., 1977).
1. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON,O'NEAL's OPPRESSIONOF MINORITYSHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354 (1978); Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L.
REV.487 (1976); Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
987 (1974); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV.L . REV. 1189 (1964); Note, Approval of Take-Out Mergers by Minority Shareholders:
From Substantive to Procedural Fairness, 93 YALEL.J. 1113 (1984); Note, Going Private, 84
YALE L.J. 903 (1975); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630
(1961).
2. F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN,EXPULSIONOR OPPRESSIONOF BUSINESSASSOCIATES:
"8QUEEZE0UTs" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES§§ 6.01-6.10 (1961) (provides a taxonomy of partnership
freeze -outs).
3. As of 1983, more than 1,542,000 partnerships existed in the United States. The total
amount of partnership assets in 1983 was over $886,993,000,000 and partnership income was
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tax code changes creating substantial incentives to operate in the partnership form.4 Alternately, the explanation may lie in an assumption that
freeze-outs do not commonly occur in partnerships. Numerous reported
decisions involving allegations of partnership freeze-outs~ effectively belie
such an assumption. Finally, the assumption may exist among writers
that courts have already issued satisfactory responses to partnership
freeze-outs. 6 A review of judicial decisions involving such freeze-outs
yields, however, a number of circumstances in which courts are at odds
over how to deal with the problem. 7 In other cases, courts have been completely ineffective in preventing freeze-outs. 8 In still other situations, judicial decisions may create more problems than they solve.9
This article , therefore, explores approaches to prevent partnership
freeze-outs. At the outset, it is important to be clear concerning what the
term means-at least in its pejorative use as something that one should
prevent. Giving this label to all efforts by partners to end their association with other partners, while still continuing the partnership business ,10
may be accurate as a literalism, but is too broad for useful analysis. In a
partnership , as in other relationships, occasions arise in which the parties
are no longer able to get along. The alternative to separation then becomes continued dissention, which is detrimental to the individuals and
often the enterprise.n The optimum solution is a negotiated buy-out of
one partner by the other in which the buy-out price reflects the willingover $784,000,000. U.S. BUREAU
OF THECENSUS,
STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT
OF THEUNITEDSTATES
506 (107th ed. 1987).
4. Under the Internal Revenue Code, partnerships do not pay tax upon their income.
Instead , the partners each report as part of their own taxable income their share of the
firm's profits. I.R.C. §§ 701-02 (West 1988). Corporations, however, are separate taxpaying
entities. Id . § 11. Shareholders pay an additional tax upon their receipt of dividends. Id. §
61(a). For many years, lower tax rates for corporations offset this so-called double taxation
of corporate income, at least insofar as the company retained a substantial percentage of its
earnings. After 1986, however, individual rates are generally lower than corporate rates. Id.
§§ l, 11. See generally Freeman, Some Early Strategies for the Methodi cal Disincorpora·
tion of America After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Grafting Partnerships Onto C Corporations, Running Amok with the Master Limited Partnership Concept, and Generally En·
deavoring to Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of General Utilities, 64
TAXES962 (1986).
5. A Westlaw search of "partnership w/p freeze-out or squeeze-out" yields ten reported
opinions in which partners alleged they were the victims of such a tactic. Numerous other
cases involving partnership freeze-outs do not use the term. See infra notes 38, 39 & 53.
6. See F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN,supra note 2, at § 8.11.
7. See infra notes 67-76, 90-97, 102-05, 153-69 & 237-40 and accompanying text .
8. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text and infra note 237.
9. See infra notes 67-82, 90-146, 153-82 & 244-46 and accompanying text.
10. Cf. Yanow v. Teal Indus., Inc., 178 Conn. 263, 422 A.2d 311, 317 n.6 (1979) (defining
corporate freeze-outs).
11. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1356-57 n.9.
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ness of one individual to pay more for the business than the other thinks
it is worth to him .12 The term "freeze-out" should not describe the situation in which a partner is unable to reach a settlement and thereupon
uses sonie tactic to achieve an equivalent result. Hence, as used in this
article, a freeze-out refers to a partner's ending his association with another partner while the business continues under circumstances in which
neither the willingness to pay a greater price nor the other partner's concurrence determines the privilege to keep the enterprise. In this situation,
an unfairness exists in both the ability of the parties to compete for the
venture, and also in the consideration the departing partner receives for
his interest.
Freeze-outs occur in partnerships whose planning consists of little more
than a handshake, 13 as well as those founded upon an elaborate written
agreement. 14 In the former type of partnership, various provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), 16 which the courts have interpreted ,
expanded, and sometimes ignored, fill the gaps of the parties' planning
and govern their relationship . One consequence is that if the parties have
not set a term for their partnership or otherwise defined the after-effects
of dissolution, all partners have the right to dissolve the relationship at
any time and demand liquidation. 16 This ability to dissolve at will both
precludes some types of freeze-outs and creates the potential for others.
Thus, part II of this article will explore how freeze-outs can occur in the
partnership at will and what the courts might do in response. Part III
considers freeze-outs in the firm whose members have engaged in some
planning. Many provisions of the UP A expressly allow partnership agreements to supplant the authority of those provisions. 17 Many who write
about partnerships have a corresponding tendency to view most problems
as reflecting a failure of planning. 18 To some extent this view is tautological. Nevertheless, the problem of freeze-outs illustrates how partnership
agreements can sometimes make things worse rather than better. Thus, it
12. In theory, the partner who possesses the most confidence in his ability to generate
profits from the enterprise should be the one willing to pay the most for it . Thus, such a
negotiated purchase optimizes economic efficiency.
For convenience, the text will often speak about the paradigm partnersh ip of two members, one who freezes out the other. Naturally, however , situations often could involve a
group of partners who freeze out another group. The analysis generally remains the same.
13. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961).
14. See, e.g., McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964).
AcT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988). Since its promulga15. UNIF.PARTNERSHIP
tion in 1914, every state except Louisiana has enacted the UPA.
16. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
17. UPA §§ 18, 19, 27, 31, 37, 38, 40 & 42 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
18. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG,
CRANEANDBROMBERG
ONPARTNERSHIP§43 (1968); Jewel v.
Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1984).

[Vol. 40

MERCER LAW REVIEW

538

is important to explore both the types of agreements that are effective in
combating the problem and how the courts might respond when individuals agree to terms that increase the danger of freeze-outs.
II.
A.

FREEZE-OUTS

IN THE PARTNERSHIP

AT WILL

Nature of the Problem

Freeze-outs in partnerships require different techniques than those employed in corporate settings. Corporate freeze-outs typically fall into two
broad types, one that the members of public corporations favor and the
other that the members of closely held companies favor. In public corporations (although occasionally used in closely held concerns 19 ) the principal approach involves the employment of reorganization provisions of the
corporation codes. For example, majority shareholders may merge the
corporation into another company (the parent or a newly created shell)
with minority shareholders receiving cash or debt instead of stock in the
surviving entity. 20 In closely held companies, the common technique involves what many refer to as a squeeze-out. 21 Specifically, majority shareholders use their voting control to exclude the minority from participation on the board of directors. Then, acting as directors , the majority
removes the minority from any employment with the company and declares little or no dividends .22 This action does not actually freeze out the
minority shareholders, but it does freeze them into a worthless investment . The majority often follows up, however, with a proposal to buy out
the minority at a low price. 23
19. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
20. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. , 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Roland Int'! Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See
generally Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1357. Other reorganization freeze -out
techniques include: (i) dissolving the company under a plan in which the productive assets
go to the majority sharegolders (or an entity they control) while the minority receives cash
(e.g., Kellog v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Co., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964)); (ii) selling all
the corporation's assets for cash to a new company, which the majority owns (e.g., Cathedral
Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 157 F. Supp. 895 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd, 251 F.2d 340 (2d
Cir. 1957)); and (iii) reverse stock splits (e.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill.
2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974)).
LAW500 (1986).
21. See, e.g., R. CLARK,CORPORATE
22. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc ., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972); Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing
Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 101 N.W.2d 805 (1960). See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON,
supra
note 1, at §§ 3.01-3.20. The majority typically continues to receive their income through
salaries.
23. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 101 N.W.2d 805 (1960).
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Partnerships dissoluble at will are not particularly receptive to either of
these tactics. The UPA contains no parallels to merger, or to any other
reorganization provisions found in corporation codes,· which allow majority shareholders to force out minority interests. 24 Instead, three methods
exist to merge a partnership business into another entity: 211 (1) All the
partners can assign their interest to the entity; (2) the partnership can
dissolve and distribute its assets to the partners, who then sell them to
the entity; or (3) the partnership can sell all its assets to the entity. All
three methods require unanimous consent. A majority of partners lack
the statutory power to require the minority to assign their interests in the
firm. Also, any partner has the right to demand distribution in cash
rather than in kind,28 thereby precluding the second approach over the
objection of any partner. Finally, the UPA forbids less than all the partners from selling the firm's goodwill or doing any other act that would
make it impossible for the partnership to carry on its business .27 Thus,
the UPA effectively precludes the sale of all the firm's assets over the
objection of any partner. 28
Similarly, squeeze-outs cannot occur in partnerships with the same
nominal legality they enjoy in corporations. Barring contrary agreement,
all partners have equal rights to participate in management. 211 The UP A
also grants all partners the right to inspect firm books and records 30 and
to demand information. 31 The UPA is less explicit concerning distributions to partners. It states that partners share profits equally in the absence of other agreement, 32 but this does not resolve how much profit
they can withdraw from the firm. The act contains no parallel to the corporation rule that directors have discretion over the declaration of dividends. 33 Nevertheless, a majority of partners might argue that under section 18(h) of the UPA they can dictate the amount of withdrawals .34 The
24. This assumes no agreement by the partners giving a majority this power. Part III of
this article considers the problems that these agreements pose.
25. See Rev. Ru!. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88.
26. UPA § 38(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988). But see infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
27. UPA § 9(3)(b) & (c) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
28. See, e.g., Bossier v. Lovell, 410 So. 2d 821 (La. App . 1982); Fortugno v. Hudson
Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207 (1957); Ditzel v. Kent, 131 Mont. 129, 308
P.2d 628 (1957); Petrikes v. Ranges, 111 Cal. App. 2d 734, 245 P.2d 39 (1952).
29. UPA § 18(e) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
30. Id. § 19.
31. Id. § 20.
32. Id. § 18(a).
33. See, e.g., Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947); Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
34. UPA § 18(h) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) (provides that the majority may decide any
differences concerning ordinary matters connected with the partnership business).
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minority, however, might argue that limiting withdrawal of profits-which has the effect of increasing capital contributions-contravenes
the partnership contract since the contract expressly or impliedly sets
contributions. This argument would place it beyond the power of the majority .3& Equally important, the UPA precludes salaries to partners unless
all partners agree to the payment. 36 Hence, the majority is unable to
bring about a squeeze-out in which it continues to receive income through
salaries while the minority does not .37 Finally, if all else fails, minority
partners possess an escape valve against a squeeze-out, i.e., their ability
to dissolve the partnership at will.
How then do freeze-outs occur in partnerships at will? Given the lack
of nominally legal methods, partners often resort to cruder tactics involving blatant illegality or force. One tactic that partners use is to misappropriate the partnership's tangible assets and to transfer them to a new
business entity (be it a proprietorship, partnership, or corporation) that
excludes the undesired partner .3 8 Alternately, partners often physically
exclude other partners from the firm's premises or from participating in
management. 39 The legal issues that these actions raise are not overly
complex. A second tactic raises far greater difficulty. This approach involves dissolving the partnership with the intent of capturing the business in the ensuing liquidation. Section 31 of the UPA provides that if a
partnership is not for a term, each partner may properly dissolve at will.' 0
Section 38(1) then grants each partner the right to demand that the partnership apply the firm's assets to discharge its debts and to distribute the
surplus to the partners "in cash. "•1 This means that the dissolving part35. See id. (acts in contravention of partner ship agreement require unanimous consent).
36. Id . § 18(f).
37. If the partnership contract provide s for salaries, the majority sti ll cannot alter them
up or down (unless the agreement specifically gives the majority this power). See, e.g., Quillen v. Titus, 172 Va. 523, 2 S.E.2d 284 (1939).
38. See, e.g., Swann v. Mitchell , 435 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1983); Pignataro v. Russo, 633
S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Stone City Attractions, Inc. v. Henders on, 571 S.W.2d
206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Johnson v. Kennedy , 350 Mass. 294, 214 N.E.2d 276 {1966); For tugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207 (1958).
39. See, e.g., Monteleone v. Monteleone, 147 Ill. App. 3d 265, 497 N.E.2d 1221 (1986);
Susman v. Venture, 114 Ill. App . 3d 668, 449 N.E.2d 143 (1982); Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.
Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090 {1980); Howell v. Bowden, 368 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Schroer v. Schroer, 248 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1952).
40. UPA § 31 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part: "Dissolut ion is caused :
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners, ... (b) By the express will of
any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified . . .. "
41. UPA § 38(1) (West 1969 & Supp . 1988) reads in pertinent part:
When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contraventio n of the partnership agreement, each partner, as against his co-part ners and all persons claiming
through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless otherwise
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ner can force the firm to sell its assets unless all the partners agree otherwise.42 The dissolving partner could then purchase the assets and continue the business to the exclusion of his or her former partner. 0
Yet, nothing unfair exists in this fact alone, nor is it a freeze-out in the
sense defined above. Competitive bidding for the firm's assets presumably
gives each partner the opportunity to be the individual who continues the
business. Moreover, the bidding between the partners normally should assure a fair price since each has the power to prevent a purchaser from
buying the business for less than he thinks it is worth. 44Thus, a freezeout can only occur through dissolution and liquidation if some factor pre vents full competition between the partners in bidding for the business. A
review of the cases suggests two situations in which this can occur.
The first situation involves the well-healed versus strapped partner scenario. Simply, this situation is one in which the partner causing dissolution possesses the funds to buy the business, but the other partner does
not. The case of Page v. Page•~ provides an illustration and something of
a variation on this theme. The Pages were partners in a linen supply business in Santa Maria, California. Plaintiff sued to establish his right to
dissolve the firm at will. Defendant responded by unsuccessfully claiming
agreed, may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and
the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective
partners.
42. See, e.g., Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 90 Wis. 2d 566, 280 N.W.2d 335 (1979); Polikoff v.
Levy, 132 Ill. App. 2d 492, 270 N.E.2d 540 (1971); Mahan v. Mahan, 107 Ariz. 517, 489 P.2d
1197 (1971); Young v. Cooper, 30 Tenn. App. 55, 203 S.W.2d 376 (1947). But see infra notes
153-66 and accompanying text .
43. See, e.g., Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 86 lll. App. 3d 437, 407 N.E.2d 821
(1980); Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979); Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 411,
513 P.2d 949 (1973).
44. Several disadvantages face the partner seeking to continue the business by acquiring
its assets in a liquidation sale. Initially, he must come up with the funds to buy the assets .
He also risks losing the assets to an outsider willing to pay more. Further, favorable agreements that the firm entered into, such as leases, licenses, or franchises, may not be assignable, but rather terminable upon dissolution. UPA REVISION
SUBCOMMITIEE
OFTHEPARTNERSHIPCOMMITIEEOF THE ABA CORPORATION
, BANKINGANDBUSINESSLAWSECTION,SHOULD
THEUNIFORMPARTNERSHIP
AcT BEREVISED?103 (1986) [hereinafter UPA REVISION].
Finally,
a liquidation sale may entail unfavorable tax consequences. If the assets have appreciated,
the purchasing partner presumably must recognize his distributive share of the firm's gain
on their sale even though he was the buyer. See I.RC. § 707(a)(l) (West 1988); Bromberg,
Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Consequences and Cures, 43 TEX. L. REV. 631, 659-66
(1965). But see Rev. Ru!. 66-264, 1966-2 C.B. 248. Purchase of the other partner's interest in
the firm, however, entails no such recognition and, if properly structured, could yield a
write-off. See I.R.C . § 736 (West 1988); Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535 (1964). These
factors typically lead partners to reach a negotiated buy -out rather than go through a liquidation sale. They also give the departing partner a better negotiating position.
45. 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961).
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that the parties had agreed to a partnership for a term. In addition, he
charged that plaintiff intended to freeze him out of a business that had
recently become profitable due to the establishment of Vandenberg Air
Force Base nearby.' 8 Specifically, he asserted that plaintiff had a superior
financial position to obtain the business on liquidation since the partnership owed a substantial sum of money to a company that plaintiff owned,
whereas a period of losses by the business had exhausted most of the
defendant's capital investment.' 7 While not explicitly stated, the underlying thrust of these allegations appears to be that defendant lacked the
funds to compete with plaintiff, who could credit bid against the debt the
partnership owed his company. 48
The second situation involves the unaccounted for intangibles problem.
Here, the partner causing dissolution is able to appropriate some intangible values of the partnership's business (elements that often go under the
rubric of goodwill) without having to purchase them on liquidation. The
tangible assets that the firm then sells may only represent a skeleton of
the business. The purchase of these assets would not allow the other partner effectively to continue the enterprise nor will their sale to the partner
causing dissolution produce anything like the fair market value of the
business as a going concern . A vivid example of this type of freeze-out is
found in Cude v. Couch.49 Cude and Couch were partners operating a
laundromat on premises that they rented on a month-to-month basis
from Couch.11° Couch dissolved the firm and announced he would no
longer rent the premises to anyone else.111 Couch then purchased the partnership's equipment at auction for a fraction of the price he and Cude
originally spent to buy the laundromat as a going concern. 112 He continued
to operate the business with his son.113
46. 55 Cal. 2d at 196, 359 P.2d at 44, 10 Cal. Rptr . at 646.
47. Id .
48. Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 410, 513 P .2d 949 (1973) (provides a second illustra·
tion of a well·healed versus strapped partner claim; the defendant asserted that the plain ·
tiffs had an unfair advantage in bidding for the partnership's property since they could
credit bid against their 85% interest in the firm). See also Davis v. Davis, 149 Colo. 1, 366
P .2d 857 (1961) (husband, in husband and wife partner ship, was unable to obtain financing
to buy partnership's assets after dissolution while his wife could).
49. 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn . 1979).
50. Id . at 555.
51. Id.
52. Id .
53. Id . Numerous other examples exist of this phenomenon . S ee, e.g., Fulton v. Baxter,
596 P .2d 540 (Okla. 1979) (defendant appropriated insurance agency contracts , lease, and
telephone listing following dissolution) ; Lavin v. Ehrlich, 80 Misc. 2d 247, 363 N .Y.S.2d 50
(1974) (after dissolution, defendant purch ased building that the partnership had rented to
conduct storefront tax preparation business); Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 294, 325 P.2d 463 (1958)
(defendants took advertising agency's primary client and employees following dissolution);

1989]

PARTNERSHIP

FREEZE-OUTS

543

B. Solutions

Dealing with Crude Expulsion and Misappropriation
The basic remedy for this type of freeze-out is dissolution. It could occur simply by the express will of the victimized partner. 64 Alternately,
this partner could sue for a judicial decree of dissolution under section 32
of the UPA. 66 The critical question is what happens next. Three outcomes
are possible.
The most intriguing possibility is for the victimized partner to claim
that the expulsion or misappropriation constitutes a wrongful dissolution
within the meaning of section 38(2) of the UPA. Section 38(2) applies in
the event of dissolution "in contravention of the partnership agreement. "66 It denies the partner who wrongfully causes dissolution, the opSalter v. Condon, 236 Ill. App. 17 (1925) (defendant owned land on which the partnership
operated a golf course). At times, the capturing of key intangible values of the business,
such as location, clients, and employee organization, coincides with the misappropriation of
tangible assets. See, e.g., Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1983); Stone City Attractions, Inc. v. Henderson, 571 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Appropriation of intangibles, however, raises two added complexities. First, there is the question of whether
they constitute partnership property. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. Also,
one partner often has or obtains a legitimate hold on these items (for example, by owning
the location as in Cude) that prevents their sale even if one could say that a partnership
asset was involved.
54. UPA § 3l(l)(b) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
55. Id . § 32(l)(c) & (d) allows a court to dissolve a partnership when a partner
has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of
the business, . . . persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or
otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him
A number of courts have held, not surprisingly, that wrongfully expelling a partner or misappropriating firm assets provides grounds to dissolve under this section. See, e.g., Monteleone v. Monteleone, 147 Ill. App. 3d 265, 497 N.E.2d 1221 (1986); Susman v. Venture, 70 Ill.
App. 3d 668, 449 N.E 2d 143 (1982); Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949
(1973); Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 251, 113 A.2d 679 (1955). But see Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal.
App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966) (attempting to misappropriate $10,000 did not consti tute a wrongful act sufficient to order dissolution).
56. UPA § 38(2) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part:
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership agreement
the rights of the partners shall be as follows: . . .
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they all desire
to continue the business in the same name, either by themselves or jointly with
others, may do so, during the agreed term for the partnership and for that pur pose may possess the partnership property, provided they secure the payment by
bond approved by the court, or pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully, the value of his interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any
damages recoverable under clause (2a II) of this section, and in like manner in-
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tion to demand liquidation pursuant to section 38(1).n Instead, the other
partner or partners may continue the business without the necessity of
bidding for its assets in a liquidation sale.58 To do so, they either may pay
immediately to the wrongfully acting partner the appraised value of his
interest-but
without taking into account the worth of the business'
goodwill and subtracting any damages-or else post a bond to protect his
interest until the agreed term for the partnership lapses. 59 In either event,
the continuing partner or partners must indemnify the wrongdoer against
present and future firm liabilities. 60
A certain elegant irony exists in this solution since it turns the tables
completely on the partner who attempts to take over the business by
force or fraud. In addition, some authority supports this outcome. Several
decisions involving individuals wrongfully expelled from partnerships for
a term held that such conduct not only constitutes grounds for dissolution under section 32, but also entitles the expelled partner to continue
the business pursuant to section 38(2). 61 While this result in a partnership for a term seems almost self-evident, it does require some expansion
of the language of the UPA. A dissolution "caused in contravention of the
partnership agreement" 62 triggers section 38(2). Section 31(2) defines a
dissolution caused in contravention as one brought on by the express will
of any partner "where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution
under any other provision of this section." 63 Taken literally, this excludes
a dissolution under section 32 from the category of dissolutions in contravention of a partnership agreement. 6' This appears, however, to be simply
demnify him against all present or future partnership liabilities.
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have: .. .
II. If the business is continued under paragraph (2b) of this section the right as
against his co-partners and all claiming through them in respect of their interests
in the partnership, to have the value of his interest in the partnership, less any
damages caused to his co-partners by the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him
in cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by the court, and to be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in ascertaining the value
of the partner's interest the value of the good-will of the business shall not be
considered.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id .
60. Id .
61. Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 254 P.2d 919 (1953); Dow v. Beals, 149 Misc.
631, 268 N.Y.S.425 (1933). See also Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938) (Section 38(2) applied when judicial dissolution ordered because of wrongful conduct by one
partner); Drashner v. Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255 (1954) (same application of
section 38(2)).
62. UPA § 38(2) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
63. Id . § 31(2).
64. See id. § 31(6) (cross-references dissolution by decree of court under section 32 and
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an inadvertent drafting error in the UP A.65
The far more difficult question is whether the same result can follow
when the partnership is at will. A line of pre-UPA Texas court decisions
held that forcible expulsion, even from a partnership at will, entitled the
expelled partner to damages-including punitive damages-going far beyond the normal right to an accounting following any dissolution. 66 Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court took the final step. In Monteleone v.
Monteleone 67 three partners operated an auto body shop. 68 One partner
sued to dissolve, claiming the others had wrongfully excluded him from
the partnership premises. 69 The other two partners counterclaimed, contending that plaintiff's wrongful conduct caused the dissolution. 70 The
trial court ignored the question of who was at fault and simply ordered
the partnership to sell its assets. 71 The appellate court reversed and instructed the lower court to grant defendants the right to continue the
business under section 38(2) if it found plaintiff at fault. 72 In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected the contention that section 38(2) could
not apply since all of the parties conceded this was a partnership at will.73
Substantial reasons exist to question the holding in Monteleone. First,
a number of courts have stated that there cannot be a wrongful dissoluthereby makes such an order a cause of dissolution under section 31).
supra note 18, at 430.
65. See A. BROMBERG,
66. See Ball v. Britton, 58 Tex. 57 (1882); Howell v. Bowden, 368 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963); Sewell v. Connor, 23 S.W. 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893). For example, in Ball, the
court explained that while defendant had the right to withdraw from the firm at will, he did
not have the right to expel plaintiff from it and retain all the assets. Ball, 58 Tex. at 62.
More significantly, the court went beyond requiring defendant to account for plaintiff's
share of the partnership's property and any profits made therefrom. Compare UPA § 42
(West 1969 & Supp. 1988). Instead, the court awarded to plaintiff damages measured by the
value of his services to the firm as well as exemplary damages. Ball, 58 Tex. at 63.
67. 147 Ill. App. 3d 265, 497 N.E.2d 1221 (1986).
68. 497 N.E.2d at 1223.
69. Id.
70. Id. Specifically, the other two partners claimed he misappropriated partnership
funds, failed to contribute to the operation of the business, refused to return firm books and
records, and wrongfully demanded that they make his son a partner and discharge a certain
employee. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1224. While not stated, presumably section 38(2) would have entitled plaintiff
to continue the business if the trial court found that he was innocent of wrongdoing and his
brothers wrongfully excluded him from the business. Plaintiff, however, did not request this
relief.
73. Id. at 1225. See also Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949 (1973) (court
suggests that UP A § 38(2)(a)(II) might entitle a partner expelled from participa tion in the
management of a partnership at will to recover damages).
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tion of a partnership at will.7~For example, in Johnson v. Kennedy, 76 the
Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a holding opposite the Illinois decision. In Johnson, the trial court found that defendant had wrongfully
dissolved an insurance agency by secretly stealing all of its assets.76 The
supreme court reversed, simply explaining that "because the firm was a
partnership at will, Kennedy's termination of it , however unseemly in
manner and method, was not a legal wrong." 77 Moreover, the language of
section 31 of the UPA might make it difficult to call the dissolution of a
partnership at will wrongful, at least within the meaning of section 38(2).
Section 31(1)(b) indicates that dissolution by the express will of any partner is not in violation of the agreement if no term is set. 78 On the other
hand, forcible expulsion or misappropriation goes beyond simply expressing a will to dissolve. 79 A more practical problem exists in the fact that
section 38(2) refers to the right of the innocent partners to continue the
business for the "agreed term." 80 If the partnership is at will, what is the
agreed term? Monteleone brushed aside this question by stating that the
agreed term remained at the will of the innocent partners. 81 The result
seems reasonable if the innocent partners immediately pay off the partner
in the wrong. If, however, they exercise their option to post a bond for the
remaining term, the result is disproportionally harsh in comparison with
the initial offense.82
74. See, e.g., Evans v. Gunnip, 125 A.2d 378 (Del. 1956); Young v. Cooper, 203 S.W.2d
376 (Tenn. App. 1947).
75. 350 Mass. 294, 214 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
76. 214 N.E.2d at 277.
77. Id . at 278.
78. See supra note 40.
79. See Ball v. Britton, 58 Tex. 57 (1882).
80. See supra note 65.
81. Mont e/one, 497 N.E.2d at 1225.
82. Cf. Dow v. Beals , 149 Misc. 631, 268 N.Y.S. 425 (1933) (refusing to allow plaintiff to
post an undertaking in lieu of paying cash for defendants' interest despite granting plaintiff
relief under UP A § 38(2) based upon his expulsion from the firm). It should be noted that
such an indefinite delay in payment will occur if a partner wrongfully leaves a partnership
whose term is until such time as the partners agree to dissolve. In this event, however, the
partners specifically agreed to an open-ended term for the venture with its concomitant
disability on their withdrawing their capital for an indefinite period of tim e.
Monteleone also raises the possibility that the wrongful conduct of the expelled partner
may just ify the expulsion. The notion of a justifiable freeze-out from a partnership at will
presents several difficultie s. First, the UPA indicates that expulsion does not contravene the
partnership contract when it is "in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement." UPA § 31(l)(d) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988). The negative implication is that expulsion from a firm whose agreement does not confer this power contrav enes the contract. See
Hillman, M isconduct as a Bas is for Excluding or Expelling a Partner: Effecting Commercial Diuorce and Securing Custody of the Bu siness, 78 Nw. U.L. RE V. 527, 539 ( 1983). Moreover , sect ion 32 provides partners the ability to seek a judicial decree of dissolution in the
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A second alternative following dissolution is for the victimized partner
to concede the business and simply demand payment for the appraised
value of his interest as well as compensation for the delay in payment.
Section 42 of the UPA provides this option. 83 This section indicates that
when a partner retires and other partners continue the business without
settling accounts, the departing partner is entitled to receive the value of
his interest as of the date of dissolution plus his choice of interest or
profits accrued from leaving this sum in the business. To the extent a
wrongfully expelled partner wishes this remedy, there is little question it
event of wrongful conduct. See supra note 55. This section suggests the UPA contemplates
a judicial determination of wrongful conduct rather than self-help, at least without an expulsion provision in the partnership contract.
Assuming courts nevertheless accept this approach, they face a spectrum of possible out comes. Monteleone provides a good illustration. The plaintiff's conduct there could have
been sufficiently egregious both to justify the defendants' self-help remedy of expelling him
and to allow them to continue the business under section 38(2). At least one court , however,
has indicated in the context of a partnership for a term that some conduct might be sufficiently wrongful to allow dissolution under section 32 (and continuation of the business
under section 38(2)), but not so bad as to allow self-help expulsion. Vangel v. Vangel, 116
Cal. App. 2d 615, 626, 254 P.2d 919, 926 (1953). See generally, Hillman, supra at 541. If the
plaintiff's actions came within these parameters, then the defendants acted wrongfully
themselves in expelling him. If both sides were in the wrong, presumably neither can continue the business under section 38(2). Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J . 251, 113 A.2d 679, 683, 685
(1955). Also, if the plaintiff acted wrongfully, he still does not forfeit his interest in the
partnership. See, e.g., Dobson v. Dobson , 594 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); B.K.K. Co.
v. Schultz , 7 Cal. App. 3d 786, 86 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1970). Hence, even if the defendants could
legitimately expel the plaintiff, their failure to account for his interest (thereby forcing him
to sue) may itself have been wrongful conduct. Alternately, the plaintiff's conduct may have
been wrongful, but not sufficient to either justify his expulsion or the defendants' continuing
the business under section 38(2). See, e.g., Engel v. Vernon, 215 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 1974)
(violation of partnership agreement did not harm other partner); Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal.
App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966) (attempting to misappropriate $10,000 did not justify
dissolution); Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 195 A. 901 (1938). Presumably, the plaintiff then
becomes the aggrieved partner entitled to invoke section 38(2). Finally, the plaintiff's conduct might not have been wrongful at all. Of course, courts can remove the need to resolve
all these possibilities (and the concomitant risks they impose upon actions undertaken by
partners) by refusing to find section 38(2) applicable to partnerships at will.
83. UPA § 42 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part:
When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued under any of
the conditions set forth in section 41(1, 2, 3, 5, 6), or section 38(2b) without any
settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership
continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representative as
against such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date
of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount
equal to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at
his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu of interest, the profits
attributable to the use of his right in the property of the dissolved partnership
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should apply. 8 • The partner misappropriating the business can hardly
complain about paying the other partner for his interest. While section 42
may put the departing partner in something of a no-lose situation, 8 & this
is not too harsh a penalty on the partner who boots another out of the
firm.
Finally, if the victimized partner is not satisfied with receiving the appraised value of his interest, he has the option to demand liquidation.
This result is clear under the statute. Section 42 applies only if the departing partner consents to allow the other partner or partners to continue the business. 86 If he does not consent, the liquidation right contained in section 38(1) remains available. 87 Even if the result were not
clear under the statute, elementary policy considerations compel the same
conclusion. If courts relegate the wrongfully expelled partner exclusively
to receiving payment for the appraised value of his interest, this rewards
the partner for kicking the other out by guaranteeing that he will be the
one to continue the enterprise. This alternative could only encourage an
84. See, e.g., Pignataro v. Russo, 633 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Stone City Attractions v. Henderson, 571 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). But see Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J.
374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953). In Blut, the court refused to allow the estate of a deceased partner
to obtain profits pursuant to section 42 when the estate did not explicitly consent to the
surviving partners continuing the business (albeit the estate did not obtain liquidation). The
court correctly notes that the language of section 42, by its cross-reference to section 41,
applies when the business continues with the consent of the departing partner. It displays,
however, a cramped interpretation of "consent." The departing partner seemingly exercises
consent to continue the business when he does not demand liquidation (this being the statutory alternative to section 42's buy-out). Indeed, the trial court in Blut awarded the estate
the value of its interest without selling the partnership's assets, 99 A.2d at 789, something
only provided for under section 42 and improper had the estate demanded liquidation. See
supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
85. If the business does well, the departing partner can demand a share of the profits
that the partnership made before the settling of accounts. If the firm's assets significantly
appreciate, the departing partner might forego his section 42 remedy and demand liquidation. See supra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if the business
does poorly prior to the settling of accounts, the departing partner is entitled to demand
fixed interest for the use of his capital. Moreover, a decline in the value of the firm's assets
will not affect him, since section 42 specifies valuation as of the date of dissolution . See
generally M & C Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1938) (explaining
that section 42 is designed to put the risk of loss on the continuing partner).
86. Blut v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953). Commentators have criticized Blut for
its refusal to allow the estate of a deceased partner to collect profits under section 42 when
the estate evidently did not specifically consent to the continuation of the business (albeit
the firm was not liquidated). Note, Profit Rights and Creditors ' Priorities After a Partner's
Death or Retirement : Section 42 of the UPA, 63 YALE L.J. 709 (1954). Whether the section
chokes off a departing partner's right to demand liquidation, however, presents a very dif ferent question.
87. See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
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unfortunate degree of reliance on self-help and force.

Dealing with Dissolution

and Liquidation Freeze-Outs

Freeze-outs through dissolution and liquidation pose a much less tractable problem than the crude techniques considered above. Indeed, a pair
of writers some years ago stated that the technique in many instances
proves to be unimpeachable. 88 This view is too pessimistic. Authority exists for five different approaches to the problem. The following text explores their strengths and weaknesses.
Judicial Scrutiny for Bad Faith Dissolution. One approach to deal
with freeze-outs through dissolution and liquidation is to assert that such
a plan breaches a partner's fiduciary duty. It is well established that partners' fiduciary duties to each other extend through liquidation. 89 In now
famous dictum, the California Supreme Court in Page v. Page 90 warned
that dissolving a partnership in bad faith to freeze out a partner at an
unfair price violates this duty and constitutes a wrongful dissolution. 91
Whether this approach provides a viable solution to the problem depends
upon the answers to several questions.
First, what support exists for the court's assertion that a partner's motive qualifies his right to dissolve a partnership at will? The court, in its
dictum , enters the fray affecting many areas of law regarding whether
conduct otherwise unassailable creates liability when undertaken with
bad motives. 92 While Page does not cite them, earlier cases involving
partnerships at will already had divided over this question. For example,
88. F. O'NEAL& J. DERWIN
, supra note 2, at § 6.04.
89. See, e.g., UPA § 21 (West 1969 & Supp . 1988); Leff v. Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 658
P.2d 740, 189 Cal. Rptr 377 (1983); Woodruff v. Bryant, 558 S.W.2d 535 (Te x. Civ. App.
1977); Lavin v. Ehrlich, 80 Misc. 2d 247, 363 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1974); but see Babray v. Carlino,
2 Ill. App. 3d 241, 276 N.E.2d 435 (1971) (fiduciar y relationship ends at dissolution).
90. 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961).
91. 359 P.2d at 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
92. Compare Gans v. Delaware Terminal Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 69, 2 A.2d 154 (1938) (holding that if an act is otherwise lawful, no one can claim to be damaged by it due to the fact
that either bad faith or malicious purpose inspired it), with Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145,
119 N.W. 946 (1909) (contrary holding) . One of the situations in which courts have divided
on thi s issue is dealing with spite fences (i.e., obstructions to a neighbor's light and air
motivated solely by malice). Compare Musumeci v. Leonardo , 77 R.l. 255, 75 A.2d 175
(1950) (holding that no cause of action in nuisance exists simply because an otherwise lawful
construction was done for a malicious purpose), with Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367,
509 P.2d 785 (1973) (contrary holding). See generally Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as
a Private Nuisance, 65 CALIF.L. REV.94, 99-102 (1977). Of more direct relevance, a similar
division exists when dealing with corporate freeze -outs. Compare Rossing v. State Bank, 181
Iowa 1013, 165 N.W. 254 (1917) (dissolution held not unlawful because of a motive to freeze
out minority shareholders), with Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1941) (contrary authority).
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over a century before Page, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Howell v.
Harvey 93 faced a situation in which a partner dissolved a partnership to
appropriate for himself profits that the firm could have made in a rising
market for its goods.94 The court held that a partner lacks the right to
dissolve in bad faith even a partnership at will.96 On the other hand, in
Salter v. Condon, 96 the Illinois Appellate Court rejected Howell and held
that a partner's intent did not determine his right to terminate such a
partnership. 97
Adoption of the UPA failed to resolve this division. Section 31(l)(b)
states that a partner can dissolve the firm without violating the partnership agreement when the agreement specifies no term. 98 But this section
does not expressly rule out any good faith limit upon a decision to dissolve. Page cited section 21 in support of its dictum. 99 Section 21, however, says nothing about a good faith limitation on dissolution. It simply
requires a partner to account for any profits made in connection with the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership. 100 While this section provides the statutory foundation for partners' fiduciary duties, 101 it

93. 5 Ark. 270 (1843).
94. Id. at 270.
95. Id. at 280-81. See also Trigg v. Shelton , 249 S.W. 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (dictum). Howell seemingly illustrates effective use of the good faith approach to prevent a
freeze-out. Yet, given the fact that the defendant appropriated a partnership opportunity, it
was unnecessary to explore the motives for the dissolution. Even if the firm dissolved for
entirely innocent causes (such as death or the expiration of its term), the defendant
breached his duty in taking the opportunity. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 158,
164 N.E. 545 (1928).
96. 236 Ill. App. 17 (1925).
97. Id. at 25-26. The situation in Salter was remarkably similar to that in Cude v.
Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), discussed in text accompanying supra notes 49-53.
Condon entered into a partnership with Salter to develop land that Condon owned into a
golf course. After Salter completed the course and built up the business , Cond on dissolved
the partnership and continued to operate the golf course on his own. The court 's statement
about bad faith was dictum, however, since it found no evidence of a fraudulent design. (It
is difficult to understand why Condon's conduct could not allow this inference.) For other
cases suggesting that good faith does not limit dissolution of a partnership at will, see, e.g.,
Evans v. Gunnip, 125 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1956), modified, 135 A.2d 128 (Del. 1957); Young v.
Cooper , 203 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. App. 1947); Freund v. Murra y, 39 Mont. 539, 104 P . 683
(1909).
98. See supra note 40.
99. 55 Cal. 2d at 197, 359 P.2d at 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
100. UPA § 21 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) reads in pertinent part:
(1) Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners
from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property.
101. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG,
supra note 18, at 389; R. REUSCHLEIN
& W. GREGORY
, HAND·
BOOKONTHELAWOF AGENCY
ANDPARTNERSHIP
277 (1979).
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does not indicate that those duties require a good faith motive to dissolve
a partnership at will.
Since Page, there has been uncertain adherence to its dictum by other
courts. California courts, of course, follow Page. 102Illinois also may have
backed off Salter. 103 Decisions in other jurisdictions, however, have either
equivocated 10• or rejected any limits on the right to dissolve a partnership
at will. 105
Having ignored the partnership cases, Page turned for support to cases
involving corporate freeze-outs. 106A number of courts have held that majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority by merging101or dissolving 108a corporation in order to freeze out the minority

102. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 180 (1983).
103. In Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 86 Ill. App. 3d 437, 407 N.E.2d 821 (1980),
an Illinois Appellate Court faced the contention that the dissolution of a limited partnership
and subsequent sale of its assets to the limited partners constituted a freeze-out. Rather
than reject the claim out of hand (and without citing Salter), the court indicated that plaintiff's purchase of the assets did not show that the dissolution and sale "were merely a device
to exclude defendants from the business." 407 N.E.2d at 832. The court thus hinted at a
willingness to attack dissolutions that were merely such a device. It should be noted, however, that Mandell did not involve a partnership at will.
104. In Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975), the Oregon Supreme Court
replied to an argument that defendant dissolved in bad faith by saying, "assuming that
there was such a duty of good faith in this case, the evidence proves that defendant acted in
good faith and did not act in contravention of the oral partnership at will." 541 P.2d at 824
(emphasis added). In Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), Cude charged that his
partner, Couch, breached his fiduciary duty by secretly buying the firm's assets in a liquidation sale after depressing their value by refusing to lease the firm's premises. At one point in
its opinion, the majority of the court stated that no evidence existed to show that Couch
used his advantage of owning the firm's premises to force out Cude, thereby suggesting a
willingness to consider a bad faith freeze-out claim. Id. at 556. Nevertheless, for the most
part, both majority and dissenting opinions focused upon the question of whether any
breach of fiduciary duty occurred in carrying out the liquidation rather than in Couch's
decision to dissolve. In Prentiss v. Sheffel, 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949 (1973), the
court's opinion refers to a lack of evidence that plaintiffs excluded defendant from management in bad faith rather than because of the inability of the partners to get along. The court
subsequently in the opinion distinguished cases that defendant cited, as involving bad faith
or other wrongful conduct. Yet, it is unclear whether the court meant by these references to
suggest that the simple decision to dissolve (in contrast to freezing a partner out of management before dissolving the firm) is subject to a good faith limit.
105. See Johnson v. Kennedy, 350 Mass. 294, 214 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
106. 55 Cal. 2d at 197, 359 P.2d at 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
107. See, e.g., Roland Int'! Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
108. See, e.g., Kellog v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964);
Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936). Page cited In re Security Finance Co.,
49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957). In Security Finance, the California Supreme Court held
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shareholders. At first glance, these cases seem to provide solid support for
the Page dictum. This support is especially evident given the traditionally greater fiduciary duty owed between partners compared to the duty
existing between shareholders. 109 On further reflection, however, the analogy shows weaknesses. Typically, corporate freeze-outs involve director as
well as shareholder action. 110 Indeed, merger provisions of corporation
codes require the board to initiate the transaction. 111 Directors owe a
duty to all shareholders, 112 a duty not completely analogous to whatever
obligation partners have to temper the exercise of their personal rights
with good faith motives. 113 Moreover, the corporate freeze-out cases involve the use (or one might say misuse) of statutory provisions whose
purpose (with some possible exceptions 1 u) is not to provide a tool for
excluding minority shareholders. m This use of statutory provisions
that the corporation code section allowing voluntary dissolution did not grant holders of
50% or more of the shares the absolute right to dissolve. Id. at 376-77, 317 P.2d at 5. Instead, the shareholders must act in good faith. Id. The court then examined the motives
behind the petitioner's decision to dissolve and found it represented a legitimate attempt by
a shareholder getting an insufficient return to protect his investment. Id. at 378, 317 P.2d at
6.
109. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578,
328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (holding shareholders in close corporations have the same fiduciary
duty to each other as do partners and contrasting that to the less stringent standard covering shareholders in corporations generally).
llO. This is true of all the corporate freeze-out cases cited in supra notes 107 & 108,
except for In re Security Finance Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957). There, a 50%
shareholder filed with the corporation his consent for voluntary dissolution and thereupon
petitioned the court to supervise the company's winding up. Id. at 376-77, 317 P.2d at 5.
111. E.g., DEL. CODEANN.tit. 8 § 251(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988); CAL.CORP.CODE§ 1200
(West 1977). See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (noting that directors
may not delegate to the shareholders the director 's duty to decide whether to approve a
merger). Some codes, however, allow a short form merger between a parent company and its
over 90% owned subsidiary, which only the directors of the parent corporation must approve. See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8 § 253(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988). But see CAL.CORP.
CODE§ lllO(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988) (requiring approval by the subsidiary's directors).
112. E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
113. See UP A REVISION,
supra note 44, at 78 (a partner is entitled to act more in self
inter est than is a director).
ll4. A number of judicial opinions express the view that the purpose of short form
merger stat utes is to allow the parent to cash out minority shareholders of the subsidiary.
See, e.g., Willcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 401 (1966); Stauffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc. , 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). But see Roland Int '! Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979) (holding the parent must have a legitimate business purpose for cashing out the minority in a short form merger).
115. Statutes allowing merger s (with the possible exception of those allowing short form
mergers) have as their purpose the combination of two corporate entities into one rather
than the exclusion of shareholders. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). Even code provisions allowing voluntary dissolution generally have as their purpose the discontinuation of the company's business rather
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stands in contrast to partnership dissolution at will. Partners agree to
dissolution at will for the very purpose of being able to cease their association at any time . The corollary to this difference is a divergence in expectations between partners and shareholders regarding the permanence
of their interest in the venture. 116 Another factor is that in the corporate
merger and even most of the dissolution cases the majority shareholders
obtain the business without purchasing it in a liquidation sale. 117 Thus,
the minority shareholders lacked the ability of partners following dissolution to defend their own interests by bidding for the business. Finally,
considerable disagreement exists among courts regarding whether corporate freeze-outs are allowable, at least so long as there is no deception,
and the minority receives an adequate price for their shares. 118
The final source one could look to in support of the Page dictum is a
group of cases that has held that other terminable at will contracts cannot be ended in bad faith. It is hornbook law that all contracts impose a
duty of good faith and fair dealing. 119 Whether this duty qualifies the
right to end a terminable at will contract, however, is the subject of considerable disagreement. 120 At the heart of the controversy is the question
than its continuation simply excluding some shareholders. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel
Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942); Theis v. Spokane Falls
Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904).
116. Indeed, the impermanence of a partnership versus a corporation is one factor often
cited as a reason for choosing to do business in the later form. See, e.g., W. PAINTER,Bus1NESSPLANNING
PROBLEMS
ANDMATERIALS
6 (2d ed. 1984).
117. In fact, in a number of the corporate dissolution freeze-out cases, the court objected
to the majority's conduct on this ground. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp. ,
227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Zimmerman v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 61 Cal.
App. 2d 585, 143 P.2d 409 (1943). In Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942), the directors apparently put the corporation's tan gible assets up for bids. Nevertheless, they already had destroyed the company's going-concern value by failing to seek new customers.
118. Compare Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins
Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. ,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer's adoption of a business purpose requirement
for a valid cash-out merger); Yanow v. Teal Indus., 178 Conn. 263, 422 A.2d 311 (1979)
(holding the Connecticut appraisal statute provides the exclusive remedy for shareholders
cashed out in a short form merger).
119. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1979).
120. Compare Cleary v. American Airlines , 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980) (implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing qualifies the right to te rmi nate at will employment); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977) (same); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 comment e (1979) (duty of
good faith qualifies the right to terminate a contract), with Brockmeyer v. Dun & Brad street, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (rejecting good faith limit on termination of
at will employment); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d
86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (same); Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 116
F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940) (rejecting good faith limit on termination of franchise ).
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of whether a good faith limit contradicts the at will term. There is substantial authority that the requirement of good faith, being an implied
term, can supplement but not repeal the terms of a contract. 121 Courts
that refuse to accept a good faith limitation on termination at will explain
that this limitation would contradict the right, since implicit in an at will
term is the notion that there is no review of reasons for the action. 122 The
opposing view is that parties agreeing to an at will term do not agree to
an abuse of the power. 123 The issue has arisen in a number of areas, 12 • but
especially in the context of franchise terminations 126 and, with growing
frequency, in termination of at will employment. 126 In recent years, a
number of courts have, at least under some circumstances, imposed a
good faith limit on discharging at will employees. 127
On a superficial level, these cases also give strong support for the
court's warning in Page, especially since partners have greater fiduciary
121. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984); Murphy
v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983);
VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp . 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also 11 S.
WILLISTON,
A TREATISEONTHELAWOF CONTRACTS
§ 1295 (W. Jaeger ed. 3d ed. 1961). To
the extent a contract provision allows action in bad faith, a court, however, might rule the
provision invalid on grounds of public policy. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86,
461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc., v. Ford Motors, Inc., 116 F.2d 675
(2d Cir. 1940).
123. See, e.g., Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 251 n.222 (1968).
124. See, e.g., Aluevich v. Harrah's, 99 Nev. 215, 660 P.2d 986 (1983) (termination of
lease); Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951, 136 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1977) (termination of malpractice insurance); Zaidan v. Borg-Warner Corp., 228 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa.
1964), aff 'd, 341 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965) (termination of licensing agreement).
125. See, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1940); Gaines W. Harrison & Sons v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.S.C. 1960); Watkins v. Rich, 254 Mich. 84, 235 N.W. 845 (1931). See generally Gellhorn, Limitations on
Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellation, 1967 DUKEL.J . 465, 499-505. Many
statutes now substantially limit the right of franchisors to terminate franchises in bad faith.
See, e.g., Act of 1956, ch. 1038, 70 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12211225 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989)).
126. E.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984); Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp ., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 361, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). See generally Rohwer, Terminable-AtWill Employment: New Theories for Job Security, 15 PAC. L.J. 759 (1984).
127. See, e.g., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Gates v. Life of Mont.
Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). But see Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Pamer v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982).
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obligations to each other than do parties to a franchise, employment, or
other arms-length contract. 128 Several important factors, however, undermine this support . First, as already noted, courts by no means universally
accept the proposition that a good faith limitation exists on termination
of at will contracts . Moreover, a major argument for recognizing such a
limit in employment and fran chise cases centers upon the unequal bargaining power of the parties. 129 Such disparity in bargaining power is not
typical of partnerships . Finally , partners enjoy greater protection following dissolution than do employees or franchisees following their termination. Partners can bid for the business, thereby leaving the party requesting dissolution as the one out in the cold. Partners also have the right to
have all assets, including goodwill, accounted for. 130 This right should
prevent one of the abuses in the wrongful termination cases in which the
defendant discharges a commission employee or a franchise operator after
he or she has built up the business merely to prevent that employee or
operator from sharing future profits .131
Assuming that sufficient support for the Page dictum exists, the next
question is how to define bad faith dissolution . Inevitably, the definition
of bad faith in this context will drift to either one of two extremes. Unless
courts specify fairly narrow and clear categories of action indicating bad
faith, the definition will expand into a requirement of good cause . This
movement to extremes has been the experience in other areas . For example, in the corporate freeze-out cases, courts essentially have polarized between those requiring a business purpose for the minority's exclusion 132
and those whose review consists simply of assuring the absence of deception and the minority's receipt of a fair price. 133 Similarly, wrongful dis128. While the relationship between principal and agent is a fiduciary one (RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
AGENCY
§ 1 (1958)), courts generally have treated the principal's obligation toward
his agent simply as a matte r of ordinary contract law.
129. See, e.g., Pugh v. See' s Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J . 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973); Gellhorn , supra note
125, at 468; Blades, Employment at Will us. Individual Freedom : On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Emp loyer Power, 67 CoLUM.L. REV. 1404 (1967). In Aluevich v. Harrah 's, 99
Nev. 215, 660 P.2d 986 (1983), the Nevada Supreme Court refused to hold that a lessor' s
unqualified cancellation privilege was subject to an implied covenant of good fait h. It distinguished the at will employment situation as involving one party in a vastly superior bargaining position to the other. 660 P .2d at 987. It also distinguished the partner ship situation ,
however, as involving a special elemen t of reliance. Id .
130. See infra note 235.
131. See , e.g., Payless Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Draayer, 43 Wash. App. 240, 716 P .2d 929
(1986); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
132. See , e.g., Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club , 397 Mass. 525, 492
N.E.2d 1112 (1986); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Bryan v. Bro ck & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
133. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer's
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charge of employee cases either have crystalized around a few condemned
categories-such as retaliatory firings in violation of public policy 134 and
attempts to deprive commission employees of future earnings 135 -or else
have required employers to have good cause for the termination. 136 In addition, the practicalities of litigation dictate that unless courts confine
bad faith to specified categories, the rule will turn into a good cause requirement. If a partner dissolves the firm but continues in the business,
tactically he must show a legitimate reason to be dissatisfied with his
partner or else face the inevitable inference that he acted in bad faith.
Of course, one problem with a good cause requirement is that, instead
of qualifying, it completely contradicts the notion of dissolution at will.
The only specific category, however, suggested by Page as establishing
bad faith in partnership dissolutions, is the situation in which the partner
seeks to acquire the business at an inadequate price. 137 This position's
ultimate logic would make intention irrelevant and simply command a
review of whether the price was fair. After all, if the partner paid a fair
price, it hardly should matter whether he dissolved in the hope of paying
less. If the price is unfair, it would, as a practical matter, be impossible
for the partner to prove that he never intended that result.
However courts define bad faith, the next question becomes whether
they can ascertain its presence at an acceptable cost with reasonable accuracy. Defining bad faith as the absence of good cause to dissolve introduces all the expense and uncertainty of any fault based system. Admittedly, hindsight review to determine whether justifiable grounds or
business purpose test); Yanow v. Teal Indus., 178 Conn. 262, 422 A.2d 311 (1979).
134. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959). By and large, these cases do not rely upon an implied covenant of good faith.
Indeed, some cases recognizing a cause of action for wrongfully discharging an employee in
contravention of public policy specifically refuse to hold that termination of at will employment is subject to a good faith limitation. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113
Wis. 2d 361, 335 N.W .2d 834 (1983).
135. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977). See also Cort v. Bristol -Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) (explaining
that Fortune did not create liability simply for discharging an at will employee without good
cause).
136. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982);
Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). See generally
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 493 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781, 786 n.19 (1984) (noting the lack
of any criteria to determine whether discharges without good cause but not violating public
policy are somehow in bad faith). In the franchis e termination area, statutes often impose a
good cause requirement for termination. See, e.g., Wis. STAT.ANN.§ 218.01(3)(a)(l 7) (West
1982 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT.ANN.§ 56:10-5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988).
137. 55 Cal. 2d at 197, 359 P.2d at 45, 10 Cal. Rptr . at 647.
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malevolent purpose prompted an individual's action is an increasingly accepted feature of our litigious society. Yet, it is one thing to undertake
such a task in the ordinary tort or contract case involving more or less
discrete transactions. It is quite another matter to attempt to ascertain
which individual was really more responsible for the break-up of an ongoing relationship between persons working closely together. Indeed, in the
not completely dissimilar context of marital dissolution, all states have
abandoned the task and instead allow no-fault divorce. 138 The added uncertainty resulting from a system in which courts second guess whether a
partner dissolved in bad faith or with good cause creates another impact.
It will make a partner planning to continue in the field less willing to
dissolve the firm.139 Whether this unwillingness is good or bad may depend upon one's point of view. It seems questionable under economic wisdom, however, to interfere unnecessarily with attempts by partners to
seek more harmonious or efficient ownership groupings. After all, partners
have an incentive not to break up an economically efficient combination
of owners-which is the reason the partners initially formed the firm. In
addition, had they desired, the partners could have imposed limitations
on such freedom of action as a precondition for their joining the venture.
For these reasons, defining bad faith as paying an unfairly low price
would appear the better approach. Use of appraisal testimony by courts
to value partnerships as well as other business entities is extremely common. 140 Of course, the best evidence of a fair price is normally that set by
an arms-length sale.141 Since partnership liquidation involves such a sale,
the only possibility of an unfairly low price occurs in the two situations
outlined earlier: 142 (1) the well-healed versus strapped partner scenario,
and (2) the unaccounted for intangibles problem. Yet, in the latter situation, one cannot determine whether the price is unfairly low without establishing whether the partner appropriated intangible assets belonging
to the firm. If a partner appropriated such assets, however, he must account for their value irrespective of the cause of dissolution, 10 and the
138. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM.L.Q. 331,
341-43 (1986).
139. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Ventur e: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partn erships and Close Corporations, 67
MINN.L. REV. 1, 31 (1982).
140. For a general discussion of methods that courts and appraisers use to value businesses and interests therein, see Haynsworth, Valuation of Business Interes ts, 33 MERCER
L. REV. 457 (1982).
141. Cude v. Couch , 588 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tenn. 1979); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
552 F.2d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Fortier v. Fortier , 34 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973).
142. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
143. See infra note 235.
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Page dictum about bad faith adds nothing . This leaves a fair price review
only relevant to protect a financially strapped partner . Thi s situation , in
fact, was the defendant's claim in Page.
Relevant to the bad faith approach is the question of appropriate remedy. Page suggested that a bad faith dissolution would be wrongful within
the meaning of section 38(2) of the UP A.w The problems with applying
this section to dissolution of a partnership at will were discussed above. 140
Beyond these problems , it seems disproportionate to apply section 38(2)
if bad faith simply means paying an inadequate price. A sufficient remedy
in this case would be to pay the difference. The flip side is, if damages are
the exclusive remedy, this approach would in large part define bad faith
de facto as paying an inadequate price. This logic applies because if a
partner dissolved without good cause or with other ill motives, but paid a
fair price, there usually would be no damage. m
In-Kind Distribution to the More Deserving Partn er. A more radical
alternative to prevent freeze-outs in liquidation sales is to eliminate such
sales. Instead, the court could order a distribution of all the business assets to the partner who is more equitably entitled to carry on the venture
and provide an appraised buy-out price for the other . In fact, some courts
have followed this approach . Prior to the UPA, a number of decisions
held that the trial court has discretion following dissolution to order either the sale of the partnership's assets or instead divide them between
the partners. 147 These decisions explain that normally , the trial judge
should exercise his discretion to favor a sale as the fairer solution. 148 Occasionally, however, courts have held that it is more equitable to order an
in-kind distribution.m Typically , the in-kind distributions occurred in
144. 55 Cal. 2d at 197, 359 P .2d at 45, 10 Cal. Rptr . at 647. Page only cited section
38(2)(a). Thi s provides the wronged partner with the option of electin g to liquidate under
section 38(1) and also to receive damages from the wrongfully dissolving partn er . Section
38(2)(b) grants the wronged partner the option to continue the business withou t liquidati on.
145. S ee supra notes 74-82 and accompan ying text .
146. See , e.g., Rosenthal v. Gould , 273 Cal. App. 2d 239, 78 Cal. Rptr . 244 (1969); Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied , 434 U.S. 922 (1977) (no
damage to minority shareholders cashed out in a merger if they received a fair pri ce). A
possible except ion exists if, prior to dissolution, the excluded partn er received a salary for
working for the firm. In this event, damages along the lines awarded for bad faith termination of employment might arguably be appr opriate even if th e partn er received a fair pri ce
for his inter est. For example cases discussing the measure of such dam ages, see, e.g., Cole v.
Fair Oaks Fire Pr ote ction Dist. , .43 Cal. 3d 148, 233 Cal. Rptr . 308 (1987); Sides v. Duke
Univ., 74 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985); Ren teria v. Count y of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833,
147 Cal. Rptr . 447 (1978).
147. See, e.g., Ruggles v. Buckl ey, 158 F. 950 (6th Cir. 1908); Kelley v. Shay, 206 Pa . 208,
55 A. 925 (1903); Harper v. Lampin g, 33 Cal. 641 (1867).
148. See, e.g., Harper v. Lamping , 33 Cal. 641 (1867).
149. See, e.g., Ruggles v. Buckley , 158 F. 950 (6th Cir. 1908); Kelley v. Sha y, 206 P a. 208,
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situations in which the partnership owned fungible assets (such as stocks
and bonds) subject to equal division between the partners 160 or in which
it held real property subject to physical partition without loss of value. 161
While the principal criterion in most of these cases seems to have been
administrative convenience, at least one court 162 appeared motivated by
concern about the prejudice to a partner who would have been at a disadvantage in bidding for the assets.
As explained below, the UPA should preclude this choice and require
selling the assets unless there is a contrary agreement by all the partners.
Nevertheless, a surprising number of courts, demonstrating a curious detachment, have continued to adhere to the view that they are entitled to
do whatever they find equitable. 163 Indeed, at least two of these decisions
have gone beyond the pre-UPA cases to order the entire business distributed to one partner (or group of partners) who then pay the other -partner
the appraised value of his interest .
The first of these two cases is Rinke v. Rinke. 164 This lawsuit involved
three brothers who conducted two partnerships: a car dealership and a
hardware business .156 General Motors' refusal to allow the dealership to
continue selling four different lines of cars (Cadillac, Buick, Pontiac and
Chevrolet) precipitated a dissolution. 166 The trial court ordered distribution of the assets of the car dealership to two of the brothers, who had
negotiated separate agencies (one for Buicks and Chevrolets, the other for
Pontiacs and Cadillacs) with General Motors .167 The third brother evidently received the hardware business, but, as this business was the less
profitable endeavor, the third brother complained that the dealership
55 A. 925 (1903).
150. See, e.g., Ruggles v. Buckley, 158 F. 950 (6th Cir. 1908) (stock).
151. See, e.g., Watterson v. Knapp, 35 Cal. App. 2d 283, 95 P.2d 154 (1939). Prior to the
UPA, the prevailing American rule of limited conversion complicated the distribution of real
property following dissolution. Under this view, courts would treat real property as personal
property and order its sale only insofar as necessary to pay firm debts . Any surplus retained
its character as real property in which surviving partners and heirs of deceased partners
took title as tenants in common. See gener ally I. ROWLEY
, ROWLEY
ONPARTNERSHIP
713-17,
727-29 (1960).
152. Kelley v. Shay, 206 Pa. 208, 55 A. 925 (1903).
153. Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 884 (Utah 1983); Swann v. Mitchell, 435
So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 1983) (dictum); Hankin v. Hankin, 448 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Pa . Super.
1982); Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975); Wolf v. Murrane, 199 N.W.2d 90,
101 (Iowa 1972); Davis v. Davis, 149 Colo. 1, 366 P.2d 857, 859 (1961) (dictum); Fortugno v.
Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207 (1958); Rinke v. Rinke, 330 Mich.
615, 48 N.W.2d 201 (1951); Vanderplow v. Fredericks, 321 Mich . 483, 32 N.W.2d 718 (1948).
154. 330 Mich . 615, 48 N.W.2d 201 (1951).
155. 48 N.W.2d at 203.
156. Id.
157. Id .
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should have sold its assets. 108 The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected
this contention.1 69 It asserted that nothing in the UPA requires the court
to order the assets of a dissolved partnership sold, particularly when the
partnership needs to pay no debts from the proceeds, and no one other
than the former partners was interested in their purchase. 160
In Nicholes v. Hunt, 161 the Oregon Supreme Court took Rinke one step
further. In this case, two partners conducted a business that manufac tured lead shot for shotgun shells. 162 Dissention between the partners led
to their seeking dissolution. 1113 The t rial court awarded the business assets
to defendant and ordered him to pay plaintiff for plaintiff's interest .164
On appeal, the supreme court rejected plaintiff's contention that if he did
not receive the business, the trial court must order the assets sold. 166
Quoting Rinke, the court held that if the partnership had already paid its
debts, the trial court could distribute the assets in kind. 166 It then upheld
the trial court's decision to give the business to defendant , whom it found
had a greater equitable claim. 167
This approach presents some serious problems. First, this approach is
contrary to the UPA. Section 38(1) grants each partner the right to demand application of the firm's assets to payment of its debts and distri bution of the surplus in cash. 168 The drafters of this section intended this
language to clarify that the partnership must sell its assets. 169 Further, it
158. Id . at 204.
159. Id. at 207.
160. Id.
161. 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975).
162. 541 P.2d at 822.
163. Id .
164. Id. at 824-25.
165. Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to continue the business under UP A § 38(2)
because the defendant acted wrongfully in dissolving. 541 P.2d at 826-27.
166. Id. at 828.
167. Id. at 828-29.
168. See supra note 41.
169. See UPA § 38 comment (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act , 24 YALEL.J. 617, 629 (1915). In Young v. Cooper, 203 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn. App.
1947), the court specifically rejected the argument by two partners that they were equitably
entitled to buy out the third partner and continue the busines s without liquidation . Id. at
386. The two partners based their equitable claim upon the facts that the y owned 82% of
the business and they had taken plaintiff into the busines s after they were already operating
it. Id . The court held the UPA required liquidation. Id. One might argue that the exact
language of section 38(1) does not command liquidation so long as no debts are outstanding
and the partner not receiving the bu siness gets a cash payment for his int erest. See Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 90 Wis. 2d 566, 280 N.W.2d 335 (1979) (rejecting the argument). In thi s
event, no partner is forced to receive firm assets in kind, thus see mingly fulfillin g the command of the section that each partner may demand payment in cash. There are two difficulties with thi s argument. First, it ignores the negative implication of section 38(1). By stati ng
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may not solve the freeze-out problem. The partner receiving the business
must pay the other partner the value of his or her interest. 170 Also, the
partners must pay off all the firm's creditors since courts will not award
an in-kind distribution when outstanding debts exist. 171 Yet, one of the
two causes of freeze-outs in liquidation sales is that one partner lacks the
necessary payoff funds. 172 In addition, it would hardly help to award the
tangible assets of a partnership to one partner if the other has a lock on a
key intangible-such as owning the location of the business as in Cude v.
Couch 173 -without which the business could not continue. Most importantly, this approach yields undesirable results . It is uncertain precisely
how the court will decide which partner has the greater entitlement to
continue the venture. The court might consider who contributed more to
the business' success.m Probably, the court and parties will focus upon
who was most responsible for causing the dissolution. m Both subjects are
likely to be in hot dispute .176 It is totally presumptuous to believe that
out of conflicting testimony and with only the vaguest, if any, standards
for a guide, courts can determine which partner is truly deserving of continuing the enterprise. 177
that partners only have a right to demand payment in cash, the statute excludes them from
any right (barring agreement) to distributions in kind . See supra UPA § 38 comment. Further, section 38(1) does not say each partner solely has the right to demand payment in cash
of the amount owing to him. Rather, it says each may demand that the firm pay in cash the
net amount owing "to the respective partners." Id . § 38(1).
170. See, e.g., Nicholes v. Hunt , 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975).
171. See, e.g., Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 90 Wis. 2d 566, 280 N.W.2d 335 (1979); Rinke v.
Rinke, 330 Mich. 615, 48 N.W.2d 201 (1951); Swarthout v. Gentry, 62 Cal. App. 2d 68, 144
P.2d 38 (1943). But see Walterson v. Knapp, 35 Cal. App. 2d 283, 95 P.2d 154 (1939) (allowed in kind distribution when the only debts of the venture were not immediately due and
payable).
172. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text . If a partner cannot afford to pay the
fair market value for the firm's assets (including goodwill), by definition he cannot afford to
discharge its debts and pay the other partner the value of the other partner 's interest.
173. 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), discussed supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
174. In Nicholes, the court pointed to the fact that defendant had conceived of the machinery and method of operation prior to taking plaintiff into defendant's business as a
partner. 541 P.2d at 828.
175. The court in Nicholes also noted that plaintiff had not always been attentive to the
business or heeded the decisions of the defendant, who was the managing partner. Id. In
addition, the plaintiff was late in making a payment for his interest. Id. at 822.
176. In Nicholes, defendant excluded plaintiff from the business after the two partners
apparently had patched up their differences. Id. Not only does this suggest some competing
equities between the parties, but a number of courts have held that such an exclusion constitutes wrongful conduct entitling the excluded partner to continue the business under section 38(2). See supra note 61.
177. In cases in which partners have sought to dissolve partnerships for a term by claiming wrongful conduct on the part of other partners, courts have repeatedly noted what a
difficult task it is to resolve which partner is more at fault. See infra note 266. Attempting
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Rinke provides a good illustration of the se problems. At first glance,
the court seems sensible in awarding the dealership assets to the two
brothers since they had obtained the new franchises. Yet, it is difficult to
agree with the court that the brothers did not brea ch their duty to the
partnership in individually taking the new agencies. 17 8 True, General Motors would no longer allow the partnership to sell four different lines of
cars. 179 But, why could the partnership not continue to sell two lines of
cars under one of the new franchises rather than the two brothers' taking
both agencies for themselves? 180 The court then compounded the problem
by ordering an in-kind distribution over the objection of the third
brother. The third brother may well have calculated that if he had purchased the location , General Motors would have cancelled his brothers'
franchises and given him an agency. At the very least, he could have
forced his brothers to bid generously, since if they lost their location,
General Motors may well have terminated their franchises. Instead, the
third brother received an appraised value of the dealership's assets in
which the court listened to the two brothers' appraisers over his. 181 To
top it off, the court refused to recognize any value for goodwill (since the
partnership lost its franchise). 182 The end result of the Rinke court's decision to distribute the business in kind , therefore, may well have been to
aid in a freeze-out.
A Solomon-Like Solution. A third alternative moves completely away
from fault and equities. Instead, a court might seek to avoid freeze-outs
in dissolution and liquidation by prohibiting any partner from buying the
assets unless the other partners consent. Defendant in Prentiss v. Shef184
fel18 3 urged essentially this approach.
In response to plaintiffs ' freezing
him out of management and thereupon suing to dissolve, defendant retaliated by arguing that the court should not allow plaintiffs to bid for th e
partnership's assets .1 86 The court rejected the idea. 188 Nevertheless , this
approach has a certain Biblical wisdom. It seemingly avoids freeze-outs
without the need to determine who, if anyone, is at fault. Moreover, much
to ascertain which partner has a better equitable claim in situations in which neither has
committed wrongful conduct would be even more difficult .
178. 48 N.W.2d at 205-06.
179. Id. at 203.
180. This pr esumably would have meant giving up the other agency since a partner' s
fiduciary dut y normally pr ecludes him from competing with the partnership. E.g., Shulkin v.
Shulkin , 301 Mass. 184, 16 N.E.2d 644 (1938).
181. 48 N.W.2d at 207.
182. Id . at 206-07.
183. 20 Ariz. App. 411, 513 P.2d 949 (1973).
184. 513 P.2d at 952.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 953.
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as in the famous story of Solomon's decree in the dispute between the
two mothers, 187 the hope is that a harsh judgment will spur the parties to
resolve the matter. In this case, resolution may be achieved by negotiating a buy-out acceptable to both sides.
Despite the court's assertion to the contrary in Prentiss, 188 some judicial authority, in fact, supports this approach. A number of turn-of-thecentury opinions state that a partner cannot buy partnership assets in a
liquidation sale and that any such sale is voidable. 189 The opinions further state that this holds true regardless of whether the sale is private or
public 190 and whether or not the price is fair. 191 The reasoning behind
these statements is that a partner winding up a partnership following dissolution stands in the position of a trustee (with the partnership assets
constituting the trust res). 192 He or she thus falls within the loyalty rule
preventing trustees from purchasing trust property. 193
These cases are of questionable authority today. A partner desiring to
buy partnership assets may avoid the restriction by requesting the court
to appoint a receiver to wind up the partnership and sell its property. 194
Sale by a receiver eliminates the conflict of interest problem created by a
partner selling to himself. 19 G Nevertheless , a trial court has discretion over
whether to appoint a receiver .196 While no reported decision has done so,
the court could refuse to appoint a receiver for this purpose. Very likely
the court also has the discretion to refuse to allow partners to bid for the
assets even if there is a receiver. 197 Whether or not the court should exer187. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
188. 513 P.2d at 952.
189. E.g., Didlake v. Roden Grocery Co., 160 Ala. 484, 49 So. 384, 386 (1909); French v.
Vanaltta , 83 Ark. 306, 104 S.W. 141, 142 (1907); Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N.W. 473,
477 (1904); Valentine v. Wysor, 123 Ind. 47, 23 N.E. 1076, 1079 (1890).
190. E.g., Valentine v. Wysor, 23 N.E. 1076, 1079 (Ind. 1890).
191. See Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N.W. 473, 477 (1904).
192. E.g., Valentine, 23 N .E. at 1079.
193. E.g., G. BOGART,
TRUSTS§ 95, at 343 (6th ed. 1987).
194. E.g., James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13, 15-16 (1940).
195. Id.
196. E.g., Hankin v. Hankin, 507 Pa. 603, 493 A.2d 675 (1985).
197. Prentiss is not to the contrary. The court there simply held that the trial judge
acted within his discretion in allowing partners to bid. 513 P .2d at 953. The court did not
hold that the judge would have abused his discretion had he refused to do so. In Hankin v.
Hankin , 507 Pa. 603, 493 A.2d 675, 679 (1985), the court stated that a partner had "the
right" to bid on firm property. The court made this statement, however, in the context of
explaining why the liquidating partner's interest in buying the firm's property placed him in
a conflict of interest. The thrust of the remark is to justify the trial court's appointment of a
receiver rather than to address whether the trial court could have refused to accept bids
from partners. Indeed, the court notes without evident disapproval an order by the trial
judge that refused to allow partners to bid on one parcel of partnership property. 493 A.2d
at 679.
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cise its discretion in such a manner is a different que stion .
First, this approach may not solve more than half of the freeze-out
problems . It would deter the well-healed individual who attempts to take
advantage of a financially strapped partner. It might not, however, prevent freeze-outs based upon appropriation of key intangibles . A partner
who has a hold on a key intangible could often simply buy new tangible
assets (such as the washing machines in Cude v. Couch 198 ) if the law prevented him from purchasing the partnership's assets. 199
In addition, this approach could result in a loss of wealth not only for
the partners but for society as a whole. Normally , outsiders are not willing to pay as much for the business as the partners would pay .2 00 Indeed ,
no outsider may even be willing to continue the business. The strategy
behind this approach is that lack of generous outside bids creates mutual
self interest that will convince the partners to reach a satisfactory settlement. The partners, however, may miscalculate in their negotiation , or
one partner may not act with purely rational economic motives. Thus, it
may be a bit harsh to hold each partner hostage to the other's irrationality. A societal loss also follows if this approach results in the destruction
of viable enterprises.
Removing Handicaps to Effective Bidding. Perhaps the underlying flaw
in the three prior approaches is that they do not focus on the heart of the
problem. Is there any way to attack directly the two factors that prevent
bidding between the partners from always precluding a freeze-out? The
first concern is that a well-healed partner will outbid a financially
strapped one. 201 Providing each partner with access to an adequate source
of funding is the most direct response to this situation. This approach is
not as far-fetched as it sounds . Normally , each partner expects the future
earnings of the business ultimately to pay for the purchase. 202 Partners,
therefore, do not need extensive personal funds if they have adequate
time or credit. Partners could seek financing from commercial lending
sources, but such efforts might not always meet with success.203 In that
198. 588 S.W.2d 554 (T enn . 1979), discussed supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
199. Cude also illustr ates one method by which par t ners might seek to circumvent a
restricti on upon their bidding . Couch employed one Platkin to bid for the partn ership's
equipment without indica ting Platki n was acting on behalf of Couch. 588 S.W.2d at 555. In
addition to acting as undi sclosed principal s, part ners precluded fr om bidd ing might seek t o
purchas e the assets from the successful outside bu yer.
200. E.g., Bromberg, sup ra note 44, at 647-48.
201. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. Z. CAVITCH,
TAX PLANNINGFOR CORPORATIONS
ANDSHAREHOLDERS
7-11 (1987)
(discussion of tax advantages of corporation versus fellow shareh older buying out selling
shareholder based upon tacit ass umption that purchase money normally comes from the
corporation).
203. E.g., Hilman, supra note 139, at 71.
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event, why could the court not allow an installment payment in the liquidation sale? In fact, under the bad faith dissolution dicta in Page, the
wronged partner presumably could post a bond pursuant to section 38(2)
rather than immediately pay the dissolving partner for his interest. 204
Such a bond involves a far greater delay in payment than an installment
sale since the continuing partner need not actually return the dissolving
partner's capital until the continuing partner decides to end the firm.20 ~
No reason exists to believe courts lack the power to order installment
sales of partnership property. Courts have broad discretion in carrying
out judicial sales.206 These sales in other fields have allowed installment
payments .207 Indeed, several partnership dissolution cases upheld orders
that did precisely this in selling firm assets .208
Along similar lines, courts might attempt to prevent a partner from appropriating intangible assets. To the extent the partner obtained the intangible by usurping a partnership opportunity (for example, by purchasing the building leased by the partnership 209 or by entering into a new
lease in his own name for the partnership's premises 210 ), then courts
properly can order the partner to turn over the asset for sale in the liquidation.211Courts might go beyond this, however, to require a partner with
a legitimate hold on an intangible (for example, by owning the firm's
premises as in Cude v. Couch 212 ) to make it available. Courts could, if
204. See supra note 144 and accompanying text .
205. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
206. E.g., Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa. Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090, 1108 (1980); Maras v.
Stilinovich, 268 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1978); Goergen v. Nebrich, 4 A.D.2d 526, 527, 167
N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (1957).
207. E.g., United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960) (approving a judicial
sale of real estate to pay a tax lien when the purchase price was to be paid off over five
years); Matthews v. Eslinger, 41 Tenn. App. 116, 292 S.W.2d 543 (1955) (allowing installment sale of real property); Kentucky Utils . Co. v. Steenman, 283 Ky. 317, 141 S.W.2d 265
(1940) (holding a judicial sale of the property of a corporation in receivership for a payment
of $500 deposit and the remainder in six months was proper); Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe
Deposit Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co., 84 F. 752 (W.D. Va. 1897) (confirming a judicial sale of a
plant in receivership when a portion of the price was to be paid at a later date).
208. See Maras v. Stilinovich, 268 N.W.2d 541 (Minn. 1978) (held that the court may
allow the sale of firm assets to a partner on an installment basis); Skemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa.
168, 179 (1877) (court ordered property sold to the partner with the highest bid "to be paid
within a reasonable time"); see also Hankin v. Hankin, 507 Pa. 603, 493 A.2d 675, 678
(1985) (liquidating partner undertook negotiations to sell assets on insta llment basis with
apparent approval of trial court).
209. E.g., Lavin v. Ehrlich, 80 Misc. 2d 247, 363 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1974).
210. E.g., Fulton v. Baxter, 596 P.2d 540 (Okla. 1979); Rosenthal v. Gould, 273 Cal. App.
2d 239, 78 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1969); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
211. See, e.g., Lavin v. Ehrlich, 80 Misc. 2d 247, 250, 363 N.Y.S.2d 50, 53 (1974).
212. 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), discussed at supr a notes 49-53 and accompanying
text.
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faced with the situation presented in Cude, order the partner to give the
purchaser a lease of the firm's assets. Indeed, one older opinion went so
far as to forbid partners from competing with the purchaser of the
business. 213
The problem with these approaches is that they radically alter the parties' contract in a manner highly prejudicial to the departing partner. Allowing time payments in a liquidation sale not only delays return of the
departing partner's capital (which he may need to enter a new venture),
but the departing partner remains liable for pre-dissolution partnership
debts until payment of sufficient installments to allow their satisfaction. 214 At the same time, the partner lacks the protection of being an
owner able to exercise control over the firm. Similarly, even if the departing partner receives compensation for entering a lease or a noncompetition agreement, his freedom of action is dramatically constrained in a way
for which he never bargained. Moreover, this solution creates some rather
perverse incentives. For example, suppose an individual needed capital to
start a business. He could bring a well-healed partner, later dissolve the
firm, ask the court to sell the assets on installment payments and thereby
turn his partner into an involuntary creditor. Indeed, the suspicion that
the partner may have planned this scenario from the start leads one to
scrutinize the dissolution for evidence of bad faith.
Assuring a Fair Price. The undesirable effects of the preceding four
approaches suggest that it may be necessary for the courts to set a more
modest goal. Courts could forgo trying to ensure that a partner does not
exploit his advantage to exclude another from the business. Instead, they
could simply seek to guarantee that the departing partner receives a fair
price. In fact, this seems to be the approach of most courts.m
Accomplishing this more modest task requires focusing again on the
two factors that can prevent bidding between the partners from establishing a fair price. The first factor lies in the inability of a financially
strapped partner to offer a reasonable price for the firm's assets. 216 Courts
could respond to this situation by refusing to confirm a sale to the wellhealed partner, even if his bid is the highest, unless they find by evidence
beyond simply the auction result that this constitutes a fair price. Man213. Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sand. Ch. 379, 381 (N.Y. Ch. 1846).
214. See UPA § 36 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988). Creditors, however, cannot complain
about this delay in payment. They lack the liquidation right under § 38(1) (which does not
apply if partners agree otherwise). See supra note 41. Creditors' protection lies in §§ 36 &
41.
215. This is evident from the fact that none of the preceding approaches seems to have
drawn overwhelming support.
216. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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dell u. Centrum Frontier Corp.211 provides a good illustration of this approach. The court in Mandell dissolved a real estate limited partnership
due to deadlock and losses.218 The court then ordered the firm 's property
sold in a judicial sale. Two prospective bidders, an outsider and plaintiff
limited partners, attended the sale. 219 Over the objection of the limited
partners, the court would not confirm a sale for less than thirty million
dollars. 220 (This was one million dollars more than the price placed on the
property by one of defendant general partner's expert witnesses. 221 ) The
outsider declined to bid this high, but the limited partners acquiesed to
the floor set by the court and bought the property. 222
The authority of courts to undertake this approach rests on two
grounds. First, unless the partners agree on a method of sale, a public
judicially supervised sale is necessary. 223 Courts have broad discretion in
conducting such a sale,22 • which easily encompasses setting a minimum
bid. 22 ~ The partners' fiduciary duty strengthens the court's power to reject their bid if the bid is below a level the court considers fair. The UPA
specifically requires partners to account for profits made in connection
with the liquidation of a partnership. 226 This strongly indicates that partners must not pay an unfairly low price. Moreover, the rationale behind
allowing partners to bid in a liquidation sale, despite their conflict of interest, is that judicial supervision will ensure a fair price. 227
Nevertheless, this approach faces several objections. One might argue
that the highest bid in a public sale is by definition a fair price. 228 When
all partners can compete, this is no doubt true. This view is unrealistic,
however, when one partner lacks the funds to bid what he considers a fair
price. The reticence of outsiders to pay full going concern value for a
small business, at least in a forced liquidation, is well recognized. 229 One
217. 86 Ill. App. 3d 437, 407 N.E.2d 821 (1980).
218. 407 N.E.2d at 821.
219. Id. at 827.
220. Id . at 828.
221. Id . at 831.
222. Id. at 831-32. See also Hankin v. Hankin , 507 Pa. 603, 493 A.2d 675, 679 (1985)
(examples of trial court approval and rejection of bids for partnership property); James v.
Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1940) (trial court appointed appraisers and issued
an order that the partnership's property would not be sold for less than the appraised
price).
223. E.g., Polikoff v. Levy, 132 Ill. App. 2d 494, 270 N.E.2d 540, 546 (1971).
224. See supra note 206.
225. See, e.g., Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 86 Ill . App. 3d 437, 407 N.E.2d 821
(1980); James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 794, 141 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1940).
226. UPA § 21(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
227. James v. Wade, 200 Ark. 786, 141 S.W.2d 13, 15 (1940).
228. See, e.g., Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tenn. 1979).
How
229. See Bromberg, supra note 44, at 647-48. See also G. GouLD & D. CODDINGTON,
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might also ask what happens after a court rejects the highest bid. If a
partner refuses to increase his bid to a level the court considers fair, the
court might further advertise the property and seek other buyers. 230 Ultimately, however, the court could confront the necessity of confirming a
sale to an outsider even at a lower price. This is similar to the approach
discussed previously 231 suggesting the court could refuse to allow partners
to buy the assets unless all consent. Here, however, the result is less
harsh. The partner can avoid the barrier by either negotiating with the
other partner or by paying a price the court considers fair. Also, even if
an outsider gets the property for less than a partner bid, partners have a
fiduciary obligation, not shared by outsiders, to pay a fair price .232 Events
are extremely unlikely to get this far, however. As, in Mandell, a partner
desiring the business is almost always going to meet the court's minimum
bid. 233 As a result, the end effect of this approach is to create something
approximating a negotiated rather than forced sale, with the court acting
as a surrogate for the seller .
This approach cannot solve the second factor's precluding effective bidding between the partners. This occurs when a partner can obtain intangible assets of the business without paying for them. 234 A partner can
then pay a fair price for the firm's saleable assets without paying a fair
price for the business as a going concern. Even if the court refuses to
confirm the partner's bid for the tangible assets, he might acquire similar
assets elsewhere and continue the business. Here, however, another protection comes into play. Courts can determine whether the partner appropriated an intangible asset (i.e., goodwill) belonging to the firm, and, if so,
require compensation from the partner. This is nothing new. Courts have
long recognized claims based upon the appropriation of partnership goodwill following dissolution. 235 Under this approach, for example, the court
should have charged the defendant in Cude v. Couch 236 with the value of
Do You KNOWWHATYouR BUSINESSIs WORTH?(Small Business Administration Management Aids No. 166, 1964).
230. See, e.g., Hankin v. Hankin, 507 Pa. 603, 493 A.2d 675 (1985). The liquidation in
Hankin continued after eight years.
231. See supra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
232. See generally I. RowLEV,supra note 151, at 518.
233. The court has no incentive to set an unrealistically high minimum price. In the rare
case in which a court might nevertheless do so, the lack of outside bids reaching this level
should provide an incentive for the partners to negotiate their own fair price.
234. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
235. E.g., Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1983); Fulton v. Baxter, 596 P.2d 540
(Okla. 1979); Lawson v. Shine, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 814, 295 N.E.2d 177 (1973); Wolf v. Murrane, 199 N.W.2d 90, 100 (Iowa 1972); Smith v. Bull, 50 Cal. 2d 294, 325 P.2d 463 (1958);
Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957); Vercimak v. Ostoich, 118 Utah 253,
221 P.2d 602 (1950); In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926).
236. 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), discussed supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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goodwill obtained because defendant continued pursuing the business in
the same location.
For this protection to be effective, courts must overcome two problems.
First, courts must reject the view of some older decisions that tested
whether the partnership possessed any valuable goodwill by determining
if the partnership could sell the goodwill after the dissolution. 237 The
freeze-out based upon unaccounted for intangibles often occurs precisely
because one partner possesses a grip on the goodwill that prevents its
sale. The fact that one cannot sell goodwill does not make it less real or
the partner's appropriating it any less unjustly enriched . Fortunately,
237. E.g., Spalding v. Spalding 's Adm'r, 248 Ky. 259, 58 S.W.2d 356, 358 (1933); In re
Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581, 584 (1926); Salter v. Condon, 236 Ill. App. 17 (1925).
Salter provides an interesting illustration of this approach. The court refused to find that a
partnership's operating a golf course possessed any goodwill. The court reached this result
because defendant owned the land upon which the partnership built the course and defend·
ant was under no obligation to lease this land to anyone continuing the business. Hence ,
there was no saleable goodwill since a purchaser would have no guarantee of being able to
continue the business. But see Vercimak v. Ostoich , 118 Utah 253, 221 P .2d 602, 604 (1950)
(The partnership operated a tavern in a location owned by the defendant partner. The court
held that the absence of a lease did not preclude the existence of goodwill when defendant
continued to operate the tavern in the same location after dissolution.).
The Salter opinion creates a series of anomalies. First, what happens if the partner owning the property does not wish to continue the business after dissolution, but instead is
willing to lease the property to an individual buying the business as a going concern? In that
event, the buyer presumably will pay for the goodwill. Is the partner owning the property
entitled to all of this payment? If not, how can he be entitled to appropriate the goodwill by
simply choosing to continue the venture himself? Further, if a third party owns the location
leased by the firm, a partner can neither purchase the property for himself (e.g., Lavin v.
Ehrlich, 80 Misc. 2d 247, 363 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1974)), nor renew the lease for his own benefit
(e.g., Fulton v. Baxter, 596 P.2d 540 (Okla. 1979)) without offering the opportunity first to
the firm or compensating it for the goodwill thus appropriated. It seems inconsistent with
this solicitude for partnership goodwill for the law to hold that a partner already owning the
premises is free to appropriate, without paying any compensation, the goodwill coming from
continuing the business in that location. Finally, assume a partnership uses its funds to
construct improvements on property owned by one partner but leased 'to the firm. Courts
hold that the partner owning the property must compensate, after dissolution, the other
partner for his share of the improvement's worth. E .g., Gauldin v. Corn, 595 S.W.2d 329
(Mo. App. 1980); Minikin v. Hendrix, 15 Cal. 2d 338, 101 P.2d 473 (1940); Mars ton v. Marston, 277 Mass. 129, 177 N.E. 862 (1931). But see Kirby v. Kalbacher, 373 Pa. 103, 95 A.2d
535, 537 (1953) (did not require accounting for improvement to leasehold). Under Salter,
however, the fact that partnership funds created goodwill attached to the property received
no recognition.
In defense of Salter, it might be argued that the nonowner partner could have demanded
a long-term assignable lease. See Comment, Partnership -No Good-Faith Requirement for
Dissolution, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 143, 148 (1980). This, however, injects a need for distrust
between the partners from the inception of the venture that is inconsistent with a fiduciary
relationship.
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more recent decisions reject this test. 238 A more difficult problem is to
separate partnership goodwill from the personal skills and abilities of individual partners. Older opinions often concluded that professional or
personal service partnerships lacked firm goodwill.239 More recent decisions have shown a willingness to find goodwill owned by the business
rather than just its members. 240 Resolving this issue is well beyond the
scope of this Article. The fact that partners in personal service or professional firms normally compete freely on their own merits for clients following a breakup makes this problem less acute. Courts might simply
take the position that normally there has been a reasonable in-kind distribution to the partners of whatever goodwill the firm possessed. 241
The approach of focusing only on a fair price raises two final questions.
Initially, how does this approach differ from defining bad faith dissolution to equal the paying of an unfairly low price? 242 Perhaps the end result may be largely the same. 243 Yet, speaking in terms of bad faith can
confuse lower courts and litigants. The opinion in Rosenfeld, Meyer &
Susman v. Cohen, 244 illustrates the problem. Two partners in a law firm
handled a major contingent fee antitrust lawsuit. As the suit approached
favorable resolution, they dissolved the firm with the expectation that the
client would retain them, and they would thereby avoid sharing the fee
with the other partners. This strategy succeeded, but the other partners
sued. On appeal from rulings limiting plaintiffs' claims for breach of fidu238. E.g., Swann v. Mitchell, 435 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1983); Foster v. Foster , 42 Cal. App.
3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53 (1974) (the value of goodwill in a professional medical practice
is not necessarily the specified amount of money that a willing buyer would pay).
239. E.g., Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833 (1966); Siddall v.
Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (1959); Cook v. Lauten, 1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 117
N.E.2d 414, 416 (1954); Bailly v. Betti, 241 N.Y. 22, 148 N.E. 776, 777 (1925).
240. E.g., Stefanski v. Gonnella, 15 Mass. App. 500, 446 N.E.2d 734 (1983); Cohen v.
Biernoff, 84 A.D.2d 802, 444 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1981); Berg v. Settle, 70 Wash. 2d 864, 425 P.2d
635 (1967); Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957).
241. Engle v. Vernon, 215 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 1974), provides an illustration of this position. The court found that a partnership conducting a food brokerage business possessed
goodwill. The court held, however, that the two partners effectively divided the goodwill
between themselves when each continued to act as a food broker in a different one of two
cities in which the firm had done business. Id. at 514. In the typical professional partnership
dissolution, there may not be this clean geographical division. Still, each partner has an
advantage in retaining the clients he serviced. Hence, there will naturally occur a roughly
equitable distribution of the goodwill. Of course, this solution cannot apply when a partner
retires or dies, but that does not relate to the freeze-out problem .
242. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
243. This depends upon what remedy the court awards upon finding a bad faith dissolution. If the court simply grants damages, the result is the same. If the court applies section
38(2), however, then the sanction for bad faith dissolution goes far beyond demanding payment of a fair price. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
244. 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1983).
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ciary duty, the court of appeals held plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for bad faith dissolution.m Tempting, however, as it is to castigate
defendants for their lack of scruples, the court's reliance upon their bad
faith is at best gratuitous and may be dangerously misleading. Had the
firm dissolved for completely innocent causes (for example, the death of a
partner), the partners should still have shared the fee. Indeed, the court
held that the antitrust suit constituted unfinished business of the firm,
which means sharing the fee regardless of the presence or absence of bad
faith in dissolution. 246 Yet, by speaking of bad faith, the court no doubt
encouraged the litigants to waste their time disputing over defendants'
motives. Such inevitably will be the result if courts speak about bad faith
when all they really wish to do is demand partners pay a fair price.
The more fundamental question is whether only acting to ensure a fair
price provides a just result. This question has provoked considerable controversy in the context of corporate freeze-outs. 247 Without resurrecting
this entire debate, it is useful to compare the potential harms to partners
cashed out at a presumably fair price with potential harms to shareholders. Critics of allowing involuntary cash-outs of minority shareholders
even at a so-called fair price point to a number of harms the shareholders
still suffer.248 These harms include tax burdens,2 49 the burden of seeking
new investments,m defeated expectations, 251 and the possibility of a low
245. Id. at 211, 213, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 186, 187.
246. Id. at 216, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 189. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171, 17778, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17-18 (1984) (explaining Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman); Resnick v.
Kaplan, 49 Md. App. 499, 434 A.2d 582 (1981); Engel v. Vernon, 215 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Iowa
1974).
247. Compare Borden, supra note 1, at 1039 (central issue is whether shareholders get a
fair price) with Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 1365-70 (courts should not allow
going private freeze-outs even for a purportedly fair price). See generally R. CLARK,supra
note 21, at 504-09.
248. See generally R. CLARK,supra note 21, at 504-09; Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 120203.
249. A shareholder must, of course, recognize as income any gain upon receiving cash for
his shares. I.R.C. § 1001 (West 1988). At first thought, one is tempted to suspect that a
shareholder who complains about paying tax on his profit from cashing out is crying crocodile tears. Yet, the loss of control over the timing of the disposition that results from a
freeze-out deprives the shareholder of the ability to engage in often advantageous tax planning. This includes holding the shares until death when they obtain a stepped up basis. See
id. § 1014.
250. While the search costs for new investments may not be that great for the small
shareholder in a public corporation, in a closely held company the shareholder often has
other important relationships (e.g., employment) with the firm that he may lose in a freezeout. Vorenberg, supra note 1, at 1203.
251. The counter-expectation effect of a corporate freeze-out flows from the fact that it
must employ provisions of the corporation codes for a purpose different than their intended
use. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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price due to the control of timing by the insiders.m Two of these factors
seem less apropos to partners. The flow-through principle of partnership
taxation should result in less taxable gain for a partner upon being cashed
out. 263More significantly, shareholders and members of a partnership at
will have very different expectations concerning the permanence of their
interest. 264The other two factors, however, seem at least as relevant to
partners. The burden of finding a new investment may well be greater
since partners often look to the firm for a job as well as an investment. 266
Also, partners in an advantageous position might time a dissolution in a
seemingly unfair manner. The defendant in Page alleged such a position.266He accused plaintiff of sharing a period of losses with him only to
dissolve after the firm began to show profits. 267Nevertheless, a fair valuation should consider future prospects of a business, thereby handling the
timing problem. 268 Also, partners implicitly accepted the burden of
searching for a new business when they agreed to a partnership at will.

III.
A.

FREEZE-OUTS

AND PARTNERSHIP

PLANNING

Can Planning Help?

As discussed thus far, the UPA does a good job of preventing most of
the freeze-out techniques that plague the corporate setting. A number of
approaches exist to deal with the remaining tactics. Since none of these
approaches, however, is without problems, it is useful to ask if partners
252. For an unusual example of such a timing ploy, see Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem.
Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985) (acquirer waited to perform a take-out merger until after a
contract obligating it to pay a minimum price for the minority's shares expired) . More typically, however, the timing concern is that insiders will freeze public shareholders out when
the stock market as a whole is in a slump or just prior to improved prospects for the company's becoming sufficiently tangible to affect either the market or an appraised price for its
shares. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirestein, supra note 1, at 1368.
253. Income made by the partnership raises the partners' bases in their interests in the
firm. I.R.C. § 705(a)(l)(A) & (B) (West 1988). Hence, there is less built up gain upon which
partners may be taxed when disposing of their interests.
254. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
255. This may also be true in closely held corporations. See supra note 250. Majority
shareholders, however, can often squeeze minority shareholders out of jobs with the company, whether or not the majority can also freeze the minority out of their shareholdings.
This is not the case with partners. See supra notes 21-23 & 29-37 and accompanying text.
256. 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr . 643 (1961), discussed at supra notes 45-48
and accompanying text.
257. 359 P.2d at 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
258. Indeed, determining future prospects for a business lies at the heart of valuing a
going concern. See Bauman & Komarynski, Security Analysis in HANDBOOK
OF MODERN
FINANCE16-15 (D. Logne ed. 1984).
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can improve matters through advance planning and agreement. 269
Dealing with crude expulsion and misappropriation does not provide a
significant opportunity for improvement. Some provisions, such as requiring multiple signatures in writing partnership checks or in withdrawing
funds from partnership bank accounts, 260 might be useful. Otherwise, if a
partner is prepared to disregard legal constraints, there is little an agreement can do.
More success may be possible with dissolution and liquidation freezeouts. Several ideas regarding such freeze-outs come to mind. The first is
to create a partnership for a term instead of one dissoluble at will. This
approach does not prevent dissolution at the behest of an individual's
seeking to disassociate himself from his partner. 261 Rather, it gives the
other partner the right under section 38(2) to continue the business without needing to buy it in a liquidation sale.262 Unfortunately, this solution
presents a couple of problems. Partners desiring to leave a partnership
for a term are unlikely to yield meekly to section 38(2) treatment. Instead, they can turn to either of two tactics. They might sue for dissolution under section 32. They could claim that the other partner is acting
wrongfully-specifically, that he willfully or persistently breached the
partnership agreement or otherwise engaged in conduct that prejudices
carrying on the business or renders it impractical to continue in association with him. 263 Alternately, partners may assert that irreconcilable differences render dissolution equitable. 264 Such charges will almost always
have at least a grain of truth in them or else a partner would not wish to
dissolve. The second tactic is to make life in the firm sufficiently miserable for the other partner so that he will dissolve, but without going so far
as to be accused of wrongful conduct justifying dissolution under section
259. One planning approach lies in seeking to avoid the sources of friction that often
motivate one partner to freeze-out another. For a discussion of such sources, see F. O'NEAL
& J. DERWIN,supra note 2, at§§ 2.01-2.19. This type of planning is beyond the scope of this
article.
260. See M. VOLZ,C. TROWER& D. REISS,THE DRAFTING
OF PARTNER
SHIP AGREEMENTS
221 (7th ed. 1986).
261. UPA § 31(2) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
262. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
263. E.g., Drashner v. Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255 (1954); Vangel v. Vangel,
116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 254 P.2d 919 (1953); Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375
(1938).
264. E.g., Saballus v. Timke, 122 lll. App. 3d 109, 460 N.E.2d 755, 761 (1983); Nupetco
Assocs. v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 883 (Utah 1983); Ferrick v. Berry, 320 Mass. 217, 68
N.E.2d 690, 694 (1946); Owen v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 2d 147, 119 P.2d 713, 715 (1941). But see
Lunn v. Kaiser, 76 S.D. 52, 72 N.W.2d 312 (1955) (court refused to order dissolution for
trivial disputes); Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 193, 195 A. 901, 904 (1938) (holding that a prosperous business will not be dissolved merely because of friction among the partners).
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32 and sanction under section 38(2).26 ~ In either case, the impact of these
tactics is to precipitate significant litigation over which partner is at fault
in the dissolution. Litigating such disputes is not only costly, but courts
have repeatedly noted that it is difficult to resolve who really is at
fault. 266 In the end, the result of establishing a partnership for a term is
to create significant risk and uncertainty for partners who simply can no
longer get along. Instead of dissolution at will followed by a negotiated or
market set resolution of who gets the venture and what that partner pays,
the matter is left to a third party's perception as to fault . Agreeing to a
term creates another problem as well. As discussed above, dissolution at
will precludes certain squeeze-out techniques employed in closely held
corporations. Setting a term for the partnership removes this
protection. 267
A second possibility is a buy-sell contract. The partners may or may
not accompany this by setting a term. The essential element of such an
agreement is that each partner consents in advance to waive his right
under section 38(1) to demand liquidation upon withdrawing from the
firm.268 Instead, the partner receives the price set in the contract. 289 Buysell agreements are useful to deal with dissolution in events such as a
265. See, e.g., Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 152, 113 A.2d 679, 683 (1955) (one partner hired
a notorious gangster to pressure the other to sell out).
266. See, e.g., Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 287 (Alaska 1983) ("in many instances, the evidence in this case consisted of the word of one partner against that of the
oth£:r"); Saballus v. Timke, 122 Ill. App. 3d 109, 460 N.E.2d 755, 761 (1983) ("it would be
difficult to decide which of the parties is most in the wrong"); Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins,
669 P.2d 877, 882-83 (Utah 1983) ("Volumindus trial transcript" showed that the partners'
contentions "were widely conflicting and were accompanied by extravagant accusations of
breach by the other party." Neither party proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the other breached the agreement.); Susman v. Venture, 114 Ill. App. 3d 668, 449 N.E.2d
143, 148 (1982) (trial court heard conflicting evidence as to which party breached the agreement); Lunn v. Kaiser, 76 S.D. 52, 72 N.W.2d 312, 314 (1955) (trial court stated that it was
unable to determine whether one partner was more responsible for the discord than the
other); Drashner v. Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 63 N.W.2d 255, 258-59 (1954) (evidence on fault
was sharply in conflict).
267. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Drashner v. Sorenson, 75 S.D. 247, 63
N.W.2d 255 (1954), provides an illustration of this problem. The dispute between the partners resulted from plaintiff's dependence upon withdrawing partnership earnings to defray
his living expenses, whereas defendants had other sources of support and insisted half the
earnings be left in the business. 63 N.W.2d at 258. While there was no finding that defendants were motivated in this instance by a desire to squeeze plaintiff out, limiting distributions from the business is a classic corporate squeeze -out technique . See supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text. Because the partnership was for a term, plaintiff could not protect
himself through dissolution at will. Ultimately, he was unable to prove defendants acted
wrongfully and hence, he suffered the consequence under section 38(2) of not receiving his
interest in the firm's considerable goodwill. Id . at 259.
268. See, e.g., Hunter & Haugen v. Straube, 273 Or. 720, 543 P.2d 278 (1975).
269. 543 P.2d at 283.
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partner's death or retirement. Their utility to prevent freeze-outs requires
more thought. The problem is the same as with agreeing to a term. If a
partner wishes to dissolve the association and yet avoid the buy-sell
agreement-thereby hoping to continue the business-he may employ the
tactics described above. 270 Perhaps the agreement could waive the partners' rights to sue for dissolution under section 32. The validity of such a
provision is unclear. 271 It would seem to be a foolish agreement, however,
under which an individual has no response to his partner's misconduct or
even to irreconcilable differences other than to give up the business. This
suggests that for a buy-sell agreement to deal effectively with freeze-outs
without spawning significant litigation over fault, it must specifically address the situation in which partners wish to continue the business, but
not together, and do so in a way that removes the motivation for either
side to avoid the contract. This, in turn, requires fulfilling two criteria.
First, the agreement must provide both a fair and efficient means of determining which partner keeps the business. The common language 272
that talks about the remaining partner's buying out the retiring or withdrawing partner simply begs this question. 273 Second, it must provide a
fair price and terms for the sale.
An often used technique is for one partner to set the price and give the
other the option either to buy or sell at that price. In theory, this technique gives the first partner an incentive to set a fair price (knowing that
if he sets the price either too high or too low, the other partner will exercise his option accordingly). In practice , this scheme will not work when
one partner lacks the funds to make the purchase. m The agreement
might be arranged to make provisions for reasonable installment payments. Such a delay in payment, however, may prove overly burdensome
to a departing partner looking to enter a new business. 27 ~ A second alter270. E .g., Cooper v. Isaacs , 448 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (partner sued for dissolution
on grounds of irreconcilable differences in order to avoid impact of buy -sell provision);
Fuller v. Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d 18 (1966) (defendant resisted enforcement of noncompetition provision on the ground that plaintiff's wrongful conduct justified dissolution of
partnership); Steckroth v. Ferguson, 281 Mich. 279, 274 N.W. 792 (1937) (plaintiff sued to
dissolve firm for wrongful conduct by defendant; court held buy-sell provision inapplicable) .
271. See Cooper v. Isaacs, 448 F.2d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (partnership agreement
"presumably" can prevent dissolution for irreconcilab le differences).
272. See, e.g., M. VoLZ,C. TROWER & D. REISS, supra note 260, at 224; Bromberg, supra
note 44, at 665.
273. See, e.g., Fuller v. Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d 18 (1966) (both partners claimed
the other was the withdrawing partner within the meaning of a noncompetition provision).
274. See, e.g., Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393, 410-11 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (evidence
t hat one partner set a low price in an offer to buy or sell knowing that the other partner
could not afford to purchase).
275. See sup ra note 214 and accompanying text.
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native is to hold a closed auction between the partners. 276 Here, the partner who bids the most would buy the other partner's interest. The differences between a closed auction and a liquidation sale are that the auction
excludes third parties and the high bidder purchases a partnership interest rather than the firm's assets, thereby achieving potentially more
favorable tax treatment. 277 Again, there is the possibility of abuse by a
partner with a funding advantage. The agreement might counter this possibility of abuse by allowing installment payments. Alternately, the agreement could provide a minimum bid through formula or appraisal.
The prior ideas do not prevent the freeze-outs stemming from one .partner's ability to depart with a key intangible asset. For example, a partner
who owned the location used by a firm in which location is critical 278
could dissolve or be bought out of his interest in partnership assets and
still end up with the business. 279 Can planning help here? Contract terms
that attempt to outline the goodwill the partnership has a claim to and
provide methods for its valuation might be useful to minimize and make
more predictable litigation over such claims. 280 Partners might attempt to
go further and prevent appropriation of the firm's goodwill. For example,
if one partner owns the location, the other partner could insist upon a
long term lease with the right to assign it if the partnership sells the business. An extremely common way to prevent appropriation of goodwill is a
covenant not to compete. Courts uphold such agreements so long as they
are reasonable. 281 Using such agreements, however, may yield undesirable
side effects. Covenants not to compete tremendously increase the pressure for partners to seek dissolution under section 32 (or drive the other
partner to do so) in order to avoid them. 282 Thus, these covenants might
well be called covenants to litigate.
276. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. McLoughlin, 386 Pa. 187, 125 A.2d 370, 372 (1956) (trial
court ordered closed sale).
277. See supra note 44.
278. E.g., Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), discussed supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text.
279. Id.
280. Such provisions are unquestionably valid. E.g., O'Donnell v. McLoughlin, 386 Pa.
187, 125 A.2d 370 (1956).
281. E.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber , 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573, 294
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1977); McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964). In some states,
statutes address the validity of such agreements between partners. E.g., CAL.Bus . & PROF.
CooE § 16602 (West 1987). In evaluating the reasonableness of the restraint, courts look at
its extent in time and area, measuring the legitimate interests of those continuing the business against the burdens imposed by the restriction. E.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber,
41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 870 (1977).
282. See, e.g., Fuller v. Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d 18 (1966).
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B. Agreements That Increase the Danger of Freeze-Outs

Expulsion Provisions
If partnership agreements can help limit freeze-outs, they can also create new avenues for such tactics. The most obvious way is through a provision allowing expulsion of a partner. The UPA specifically sanctions
contracts that give individuals the right to expel their partners from the
firm and continue the business without liquidation. 283 Section 31(1)(d)
lists expulsion of a partner "bona fide in accordance with a power conferred by the agreement" as a cause of dissolution that does not violate
the partnership contract. 28 ' In tandem with this, section 38(1) denies the
expelled partner the right to demand liquidation.m Instead, the other
partners must obtain the expelled partner's discharge from all the firm's
debts. In addition, the remaining partners must pay the expelled partner
the net amount he is due from the partnership. Typically, the agreement
specifies this amount. If not, section 42 fills the gap. 286 It grants the expelled partner the right to receive the value on the date of dissolution of
his partnership interest plus his choice of interest or profits made by the
firm's use of his capital since his removal.287
By definition, an expulsion clause allows the involuntary removal of a
1>artner from the firm. Whether this constitutes a freeze-out in the abusive sense depends upon two factors: First, what grounds the agreement
requires for expulsion, and second, what price the continuing partners
must pay. Specifying clear and narrow grounds for a partner's removal,
especially if limited to some type of objective misconduct ,288 minimizes
the prospects for an abusive freeze-out. Although involuntary, the partner
could have prevented removal by avoiding the misdeeds. This works especially well if an outside entity adjudicated the offending act (as in a pro fessional disciplinary proceeding) prior to the expulsion. On the other
hand, if there is no such prior adjudication , and especially as the criteria
283. UPA § 31(2) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988).
284. Id. § 31(l)(d).
285. The pertinent part of section 38(1) reads: "But if dissolution is caused by expulsion
of a partner, bona fide under the partnership agreement and if the expelled partner is discharged from all partnership liabilities, either by payment or agreement under section 36(2),
he shall receive in cash only the net amount due him from the partnership." Id . § 38(1).
286. Section 42 applies by its terms, inter alia, to partnership businesses continued pursuant to section 41(6). Section 41(6) refers to businesses continued following expulsion of a
partner. Id . §§ 41 & 42.
287. Id. § 42.
288. See, e.g., Bromberg , supra note 44, at 665 (suggested form agreement calling for
expulsion, inter alia, for professional misconduct or disqualification or for willful or persistent breach of the partnership agreement).
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for removal become more vague, 289the likelihood increases of litigation
over whether the applicable grounds in fact existed .290Lawsuits might
also challenge the procedures followed by the firm in establishing the existence of reasons to expel. 291
The goal of avoiding this litigation, as well as the desire for greater
flexibility, sometimes tempts partners into agreeing to expulsion without
the safeguard of meeting objectively determinable criteria. This provision
might take any of three forms. Partners may agree upon some vague
grounds for expulsion (for example , "the good of the firm") and leave
interpretive discretion entirely with those empowered to expel. 292Alternately, the agreement may simply name the person or persons having the
power to remove a partner and be silent regarding the reasons for removal. 293Finally, the agreement could expressly allow expulsion "without
cause ."29• In these instances, what protections should courts adopt
against abusive freeze -outs?
In the first two situations, courts could interpret the agreement to require that some good cause in fact existed for the expulsion. By and large ,
however, courts refuse to do so.295They point to two justifications for this
result . Initially, this interpretation adds to the language of an agreement,
which is silent regarding grounds for removal, and seemingly conflicts , at
least in part, with language granting certain partners discretion in finding
cause. 296Moreover, this interpretation destroys one perceived purpose of
drafting an expulsion clause in this manner, that purpose being to avoid
litigation over the existence of cause. 297Yet, to call such provisions unambiguous298 displays a rather cramped reading . Stating that a group of
289. S ee, e.g., id (also allowing expulsi on for " conduc t which tend s to affect prejudicially
the carryin g on of partner ship affairs." )
290. S ee, e.g., Millet v. Slocum , 4 A.D.2d 528, 167 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1957) (a partner' s for·
mer opp osition to a buildin g pr ogram and refu sal to sign a declar ation of inte nt signed by
the other partn ers did not constitute " incompatibilit y" within the meaning of an expul sion
clause).
291. E.g., Holman v. Coie, 11 Wash. App. 195, 522 P.2d 515 (1974) (held expulsion provision did not requir e giving expelled partner notice , reasons, or opportun ity to be hea rd) ;
Blisset v. Daniel , 68 Eng . Rep. 1022 (1853) (contra) .
292. S ee, e.g., Gill v. Mallor y, 274 A.D. 84, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1948).
293. See, e.g., Holman v. Coie, 11 Wash. App . 195, 522 P.2d 515 (1974).
294. E .g., Bromberg , sup ra note 44, at 665.
295. See, e.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573, 394
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1977); Holman v. Coie, 11 Wash . App . 195, 522 P .2d 515 (1974).
296. S ee, e.g., Holman v. Coie, 11 Wash. App. 195, 522 P .2d 515, 523 (1974) (cour t sta tes
that to require notice , and rea sonable opp ortunit y to be heard before expul sion when th e
agreement was silent , "would be to rewrit e the agreement of the parti es") .
297. S ee, e.g., Gelder Medi cal Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2 d 573, 577, 394
N.Y.S.2d 867, 871 (1977).
298. Holman v. Coie, 11 Wash . App. 195, 522 P.2d 5 15, 523 (1974).
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partners may remove another partner when they think it is in the best
interest of the firm (or some similar language), merely sets forth a sine
qua non for expulsion: that is, the partners empowered by the agreement
must make the appropriate decision to remove a member of the firm.
This type of removal clause does not say that good cause must not have
existed. In other words, the language sets out the minimum, not necessarily the entire requirement. 299 Also, it is just as rational to assume the
parties intended an implicit requirement of reasonable grounds for removal-rather than subject their interests completely to the whims of
other partners 800 -as it is to assume the parties consciously omitted such
protection because of a desire to avoid litigation. On balance, given the
danger of partners' abusing expulsion clauses to effect a freeze-out, courts
should require agreements be more specific before reading them to dispense with a requirement that there be good cause to expel a partner.
This line of defense is not available if the agreement explicitly states
partners may be expelled without cause. Courts might hold such a provision contravenes public policy. This holding seems justified when the parties to the agreement originally were in a grossly unequal bargaining position, 301 especially if the expulsion clause lacks mutuality in its prospective
impact on the partners 302 and the set price marked an intended forfeiture
of much of the expelled partner's interest. 308 What should courts do, however, if less than all of these factors are present? Disallowing individuals
to agree to expulsion without cause conflicts with the principle that partners ought to be allowed the maximum freedom to work out the terms of
their own relationship .so• Hence, if none of these factors are present,
299. See Hillman, supra note 82, at 568.
300. See Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 53 A.D.2d 994, 385 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (1976),
aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 363 N.E.2d 573 (1977), (Mahoney, J., dissenting)
("in the absence of contractual language affirming that intent, it should not be presumed
that such men voluntarily elected to hazard their livelihood to the arbitrary whim of their
associates").
301. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973) (invalidating
as against public policy grossly unfair contract terms that tend to injure the public in some
way when there is a gross disparity in bargaining power).
302. For an example of such an expulsion clause, see Frank v. R.A. Pickens & Son Co.,
264 Ark. 307, 572 S.W.2d 133 (1978) (one partner was empowered to expell any other partner and hence presumably was not subject to expulsion himselO.
303. For an example of such an expulsion clause, see McPherson v. J.D. Sirrine & Co.,
206 S.C. 183, 33 S.E.2d 501 (1945) (expelled partner under agreement received only one fifth
of the amount his estate would have been ent itled to under the agreement had he died while
a partner) .
304. See, e.g., Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 867, 880,
277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966) (partners can make practicall y "any agreement they wish"); R.
REUSCHLEIN
& W. GREGORY,
supra note 101, at 268 (partners are free to vary many aspects
of their relationship inter se, albeit not to destroy its fiduciary character).
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there seems no support for prohibiting expulsion without cause. 306 On the
other hand, allowing expulsion without cause that results in a forfeiture
of the expelled partner's interest (and thus financially advantages the
other partners) attempts to permit an action that, as discussed below,
individuals cannot undertake in good faith.
This leaves one last protection: the requirement of good faith. As in the
case of dissolving a partnership at will, courts have been uncertain regarding the existence and extent of good faith limits upon expulsion. The
decision in Gill v. Mallory 306 illustrates this confusion. Plaintiffs sued to
enjoin their expulsion from a partnership and appealed the denial of a
temporary injunction pending trial. 307 The partnership agreement permitted those holding a majority of interests in the enterprise to expel a partner if they determined it to be in the best interest of the firm. 308 Plaintiffs
asserted that defendants expelled them "selfishly" and not in good
faith. 309 The court first responded to this contention by stating it was not
the purpose of the agreement to allow litigation over such a claim, 310
thereby suggesting that a challenge to good faith was not available. Later
in the opinion, however, the court stated that it did not sufficiently appear that defendants acted in bad faith even "if that were to be the test"
to warrant granting a temporary injunction. 311
Despite Gill, it is reasonably clear that at least some good faith limit
exists on expulsions. Unlike the situation with dissolution at will, here the
UPA expressly provides this result. Both sections 31(1)(d) and 38(2)
speak of "bona fide" expulsions. 312 One part of the definition of bona fide
is in good faith. 313 In addition, partners have less inherent protection
against abuse of an expulsion provision than they do against the consequences of dissolution at will. After dissolution of a partnership at will,
all partners can bid for the business in the ensuing liquidation. By contrast, the UP A relegates the expelled partner to whatever price the agree305. See, e.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber , 53 A.D.2d 994, 385 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976),
aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867, 870 (1977) (upholding expulsion without cause as long as "no undue penalty or unjust forfeiture, overreaching or other
violation of public policy" involved).
306. 274 A.O. 84, 80 N .Y.S.2d 155 (1948).
307. 80 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
308. Id . at 157.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id . at 183-84. In Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573,
394 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1977), the New York Court of Appeals still seemed uncertain as to good
faith limits on expulsion. It held that "even if' the limit does exist, it was up to the expelled
partner to prove bad faith. 363 N.E.2d at 577, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
312. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
313. E .g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (5th ed. 1979).
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ment provides. 314
The critical question, therefore, becomes how to define good faith. This
is straightforward when the contract requires some cause to remove a
partner. Here, good faith requires two things: First, that the expelling
partners in fact believe the required grounds exist, and second, that the
specified reason actually motivated their decision. 3111 Indeed, in this context, it is easy to see why the drafters of the UPA used the term "bona
fide." If the contract allows expulsion without cause, however, good faith
obviously cannot have this meaning. The earlier discussion of a good faith
limit on dissolution at will suggested that the definition of good faith in
that context would drift either toward a requirement of good cause to
dissolve or else just become a review to ensure the partner buying the
assets in liquidation paid a fair price. 316 A provision allowing expulsion
without cause precludes defining good faith to require the existence of
good cause. This suggests good faith may really be interpreted as paying a
fair price. In fact, some courts have practically reached this result. For
example, in Gill the court found no sign that defendants acted in bad
faith. 317 The court arrived at this conclusion because plaintiffs received
the same amount on their expulsion as they would have received under
the agreement in the event of dissolution. 316 In other words, defendants
gained no financial advantage by expelling plaintiffs. 319 By interpreting
the good faith requirement in this manner, courts should avoid abusive
freeze-outs resulting in partners being both expelled without a legitimate
reason and paid an unfair price for their interest.

Agreements

Centralizing

Authority

Even without an expulsion clause, partnership contracts may open avenues for effectuating a nominally legal freeze -out. While shareholders'
agreements in closely held corporations often attempt to establish management following the partnership model, 320 partnership agreements, especially in larger firms, sometimes ape the central management features
314. UPA § 38(1) (West 1969).
315. See, e.g., Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 231 Cal. Rptr. 581
(1986), petition for review granted, 732 P.2d 1072, 234 Cal. Rptr . 778 (1987).
316. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
317. Gill v. Mallory, 274 A.D. 84, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1948).
318. Id. at 86, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
319. See also Gelder Medical Group v. Webber , 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577, 394
N.Y.S.2d 867, 871 (1977) (no suggestion of "predatory purpose" for expulsion); Holman v.
Coie, 11 Wash. App. 195, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (1974) ("there is no evidence the purpose of the
severance was to gain any business or property advantage to the remaining partners").
320. Cf. DEL. CooE ANN . tit. 8 § 354 (1983) (validating agreements by shareholders of
close corporations to manage the company as if it were a partner ship).
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of a corporation. 321By doing so, the partnership agreements may make
available some of the subtle freeze-out techniques employed in the corporate setting.
One possibility occurs if the agreement abrogates the requirement of
unanimous consent in order to convey all the firm's assets .322In that situation, the majority or managing partners could attempt to sell the entire
business to a firm owned by themselves which excludes partners they
wish to freeze-out. 323Unless the agreement specifically authorizes this
transaction-in contrast, for example, to containing one clause granting a
majority of partners the power to sell all the assets 324and even a separate
-courts should hold
clause allowing them to buy assets from the firm 326
such a purchase to be a per se breach of the partners' fiduciary duty .326
There is simply no legitimate reason for this transaction. If the minority
or nonmanaging partners somehow obstruct the firm's operation, dissolution is an available remedy. 327Indeed, if the obstruction is wrongful, the
majority or managing partners may continue the firm without liquidation.328It is extremely unlikely that an agreement will specifically authorize the majority or managing partners to sell all the assets to themselves
and exclude some partners from the continuing business. If this type
agreement ever occurs, the effect is to reduce the court to scrutinizing the
sale for fairness based on price. 329
Another possibility is an agreement that gives some partners the power
to undertake the sort of squeeze-outs common in closely held corpora321. See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975).
322. See, e.g., M. VOLZ, C. TROWER & D. REISS, supra note 260, at 135 (form agreement
giving general partner power to sell all assets without consent of limited partners).
323. Cf. Flint v. Codman, 247 Mass. 463, 142 N.E. 256 (1924) (trustees of business trust
sold the firm's real estate to a corporation owned by themselves which excluded minority
shareholders).
324. See supra note 323.
325. Cf. M. VoLZ, C. TROWER & D. REISS, supra note 260, at 136-37 (form agreement
providing that the validity of any transactions between the general partner and the firm will
be unaffected by this relationship).
326. See Soderstrom v. Kungsholm Baking Co., 189 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951); Flint v.
Codman, 247 Mass. 463, 142 N.E. 256 (1924). Cf. Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P .2d 852 (Colo. 1987)
(a partner breached his fiduciary duty in causing a corporation that both partners had
agreed to form in order to take over the partnership business to issue shares to himself but
not to his partner); Morris v. Zuckerman, 69 Cal. 2d 686, 446 P.2d 1000, 72 Cal. Rptr. 880
(1968) (a partner breached his fiduciary duty in purchasing the firm's property in a sale
resulting from the firm's default on a contract to the exclusion of his partner).
327. See supra note 55.
328. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
329. Cf. Rivera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966) ("However , partners may include in the partnership articles practi cally 'any agreement they wish' and, if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated
and authorized, it would not, ipso facto , be impermissible and deemed wrongful.").
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tions. 3 30 McCallum v. Asbury 331 provides an illustration. This lawsuit involved a medical partnership whose governing contract stated that a majority of partners could amend it .332 Differences between plaintiff and his
partners led a majority of the firm to amend the contract to create an
executive committee. 333 The amendment empowered the committee to
manage generally all affairs of the partnership. 334 Plaintiff was not a
member of this committee. 33 ~ While all partners could attend its meetings, nonmembers could not participate in deliberations unless given permission. 336 The effect, of course , was to squeeze plaintiff out of participation in management by ensuring he was seen but not heard . While
defendants did not attempt to do so (and, indeed, their specific agreement should have precluded such an action 337 ) it would not be beyond the
realm of possibility to conceive of a majority's amending a contract pursuant to this type of clause to provide salaries, restrict withdrawals, and
thus complete a classic closely held corporation squeeze -out.
Of course, the best defense against these tactics is for prospective partners to refuse to agree to contracts providing a majority or managing
partner with a blank check. The question remains, however, what protections should courts accord to those who do enter such agreements? The
Oregon Supreme Court in McCallum provided one idea. It stated that the
majority could not make fundamental changes in the partnership agreement despite the provision allowing amendments. 3 3 8 Hence, the court examined the powers delegated to the executive committee and upheld the
amendment only after noting that the partners as a whole could veto any
committee action .3 39 The court also noted that plaintiff had already expressed his views and the committee was no more likely to ignore his
views than the partners as a whole already had. 340 Whatever one thinks of
the court 's idea, it stands on questionable authority. The court relied
upon section 18(h) of the UP A, which provides that a majority vote of the
partn ers governs ordinar y matters but actions in contravention of the
partnership agreement require unanimou s cons ent. 341 Section 18(h), like
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
par tner
338.
339.
340.
341.

See supr a not es 21-23 and accompan ying text.
238 Or. 257, 393 P.2 d 774 (1964).
393 P .2d at 774, 775.
Id .
Id.
Id . at 776.
Id .
T he agreement sta te d that any am endment "s hall not be discrimin at ing again st any
or partn ers." Id . at 775.
I d.
Id . at 776.
Id .
Id . at 775.
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all of section 18, however, is expressly subject to contrary agreement by
the partners. 342 Despite its loose reasoning, this approach at least provides a constraint on freeze-outs. There should be little question that
completely squeezing a partner out of both management and income
qualifies as a "fundamental" change in the partnership agreement. 343
If other courts do not follow McCallum's rather imaginative reading of
the UPA, the only protection left is to turn toward concepts of good faith
and fiduciary duty. There is no dispute that managing partners owe an
especially exacting level of fiduciary obligation toward their fellow partners. 344 Therefore, courts will subject any dealings by managing partners
favoring themselves at the expense of their fellow partners to close, and
often damning, scrutiny. 345 This should be sufficient to preclude squeezeouts that completely render a partner's interest worthless.a.a Less extreme actions, as in McCallum, however, might often survive review. 347
This is especially so if the majority or managing partners can point to
some degree of fault upon the complaining partner. 348 The final irony is
that just as the concept of fiduciary duty may provide the last refuge for
shareholders in closely held corporetions who have done too little planning, m it may become the last shelter for partners who have done too
342. UPA § 18 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part:
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be
determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(h) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership
business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no act in contravention
of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all the partners.
343. Cf. In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1980) (majority shareholders
of a closely held corporation were guilty of oppression toward a minority shareholder when
they discharged him as an officer of the corporation contrary to the original expectations of
the parties to the venture).
344. E.g., Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal. 2d 329, 364 P.2d 247, 253, 15 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77
(1961); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
345. E.g., Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
346. Cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976)
(majority shareho lders breached their fiduciary duty by squeezing minority shareholder out
of employment with the corporation; court drew an analogy to the fiduciary dut y of partners
toward each other).
347. See Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975) (removing plaintiff
from sole chairmanship of law firm's Washington branch office did not breach fiduciary duty
owed him).
348. Cf. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554, aff'd,
173 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1979) (majority shareholders did not act oppressively when
they fired a minority shareholder-e mployee because of his unsatisfactory performance).
349. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home , Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
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much.

IV.

CONCLUSION

It really should not surprise anyone that the problem of preventing
partnership freeze-outs refuses to yield to a simple, elegant solution. After all, dissolution of a partnership, like the break-up of other relationships, is often going to be a messy affair. What emerges instead through
the entire problem is a constant tension between two goals. First, there is
the need to prevent partners from exploiting an advantage to freeze-out
their fellow partners. At the same time, however, one would hope to avoid
partnership dissolution turning into the business equivalent of "Divorce
Court" in which each partner recounts every trivial incident in an attempt to blame the other for the separation. Perhaps courts and those
drafting partnership contracts can achieve the best balance between these
objectives by generally focusing their attention on achieving a fair price.

